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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMODITIES LAW
A.

What is a Commodity?

Prior to the passage of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 19741 ('74 Act), Congress only regulated commodity futures trading
in certain domestic agricultural products. 2 By 1974, many persons were
trading in futures based on commodities other than the traditional farming commodities.' Persons trading in unregulated commodity futures
should receive the same congressional protection afforded persons trading
in futures contracts based on one of the enumerated agricultural products.' Recognition of the growing number of commodities market users,'
the dependence of commodity marketing on commodity futures trading,'
PUB. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (1976)).
2 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1964). The regulated commodities under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-17a (West 1964) included agricultural products like corn,
cotton, eggs, grain, oats, and wool. Id. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 94, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5843, 5890 [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate
Report]; note 22 infra. See generally S. REP. No. 1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 138-45 (1974)
(summary of Commodity Exchange Act prior to '74 Act).
' 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws at 5859. See note 5 infra.
4 Letter from Acting Secretary of Dept. of Agriculture to Senator Herman E. Talmadge
(May 15, 1974), reprinted in 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 46-49, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws at 5884-87.
' By 1974, merchandisers, processors and producers were turning to the futures markets to minimize potential risks due to adverse changes in price. 1974 Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 18, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 5859. The unregulated
commodities being traded included cocoa, coffee, copper, various foreign currencies, iced
broilers, lumber, mercury, palladium, platinum, plywood, propane gas, silver, sugar and silver coins. See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 94, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
at 5890.
6 The advantages of trading in commodity futures include marketing efficiency, attraction of risk capital, public price determinations, lower costs of commodities to the consumer,
and the capability to hedge against price fluctuations. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 132 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House Report]. Futures markets reallocate marketplace risks for physical commodities from those who deal in the physical commodities to
speculators who are more tolerant of price risks. See Dept. of Treasury and Federal Reserve
Bd. Study of Treasury Futures Markets, reprinted in CCH [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. 20,823 (May 14, 1979); note 7 infra. Hedging is one of basic economic
functions of a commodity futures market. Hedging occurs when a businessman, such as a
farmer, counterbalances his position in the physical or cash market with a purchase in the
futures market. See 1974 House Report, supra at 129, 133. The speculator absorbs the substantial risk that the hedger avoids by entering the commodity futures market. Hedging
reduces prices by reducing businessmen's risks. See Comment, Reflections of 10b-5 in the
"Pool" of Commodity Futures Antifraud, 14 Hous. L. Rav. 899, 902 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Commodity Futures Antifraud]. See generally Power, THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF
FUTURES AND OrIONS MARKErS AND THE NEw FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT CONTRACTS IN COM-

MODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING 1977 11-17 (M. Frankhauser ed. 1977).
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and the increased potential for abuse7 led to the enactment of the '74
Act.8

The '74 Act broadly expanded the scope of commodity futures regulation. The '74 Act defined "commodity" to include the previously regulated agricultural commodities, 9 all other goods and articles, and all futures contracts"' dealing with services, rights, and interests.11 Congress
granted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission) exclusive jurisdiction over accounts, agreements options,1 2 and transactions
7 See text accompanying notes 44-46 infra. By 1974, speculators were trading in commodity futures in growing numbers. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5859. Large swings in the price of commodities
attract speculators because of the possibility of large profits, however, between 50 and 75%
of the transactions result in a loss of the investment. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, SEVENTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcURrrms REGULATION 339 (1976).
8 See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5859.
Partly because of the '74 Act, the number of futures contracts in commodities not regulated
by the Commodity Exchange Act grew rapidly. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2101 [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate
Report]. The most active futures contracts in 1978 were based on financial instruments such
as short-term commercial paper, Treasury bonds, and Treasury bills. Id.
9 See note 2 supra.
"0Futures contracts are agreements to deliver or receive a specified quantity and quality of a commodity at a certain price, with delivery at the seller's option sometime during a
specified future delivery month. 1974 House Report, supra note 6, at 129 (Appendix I); see
Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1
20,706 (E.D. La. 1978). Futures contracts are -standardized contracts of adhesion, with a
clearinghouse party to the contract as either buyer or seller. See Guttman, The Futures
Trading Act of 1978: The Reaffirmation of CFTC-SEC CoordinatedJurisdictionOver Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Guttman]; Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CORP. L. 217,
242 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg]. Only the price varies as a result of changing
market conditions. A speculator or hedger usually satisfies a futures contract by taking an
opposite and offsetting transaction in the same future prior to the trading month. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1971). Alternatively, he may take delivery
under the terms of the contract. Id. Futures contracts are not technically sold or traded.
Rather, they are formed and discharged on designated contract markets. See Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of a "Contractof Sale of a Commodity ForFuture Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L. REv. 1175, 1175-77 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Clark];

1974 House Report, supra note 6, at 129.

" 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979).
2 A commodity option confers upon the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy
or sell a commodity or future contract. See text accompanying notes 57-62 infra. Section
4c(a) of the '74 Act prohibits option transactions with respect to the specifically designated
commodities in 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979). See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (1976). Section 4c(b)
prohibits transactions in options of commodities not enumerated in 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 if the
Commission prohibits such transactions. See CFTC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 473 F.
Supp. 1177, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Commission, pursuant to its regulatory authority
promulgated Rule 32.11, which generally suspended. trading in any commodity option. See

17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1979). A district court upheld Rule 32.11 in Rosenthal v. Bagley, 450 F.
Supp. 1120, 1123 (N.D. I. 1978). Subsequently, in the Futures Trading Act of 1978, Congress confirmed Rule 32.11. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(c) (West Supp. 1979).
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involving futures contracts."3 The '74 Act does not regulate the sale of
any cash commodity for deferred delivery 14 or transactions in foreign currencies 5 not involving the sale of a commodity for future delivery.' 6 The
Commission and the courts recently interpreted the scope of the '74 Act
137 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979). The Commission's exclusive jurisdiction extends
only to transactions involving futures contracts traded or executed on a designated contract
market, or other board of trade, exchange, or market. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979).
A "board of trade" includes any exchange or association of persons engaged in the business
of buying or selling any commodity or receiving any commodity for sale on consignment. Id.;
see CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1979).
The congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Commission over accounts involving futures contracts presented a conflict with the SEC over discretionary accounts involving commodity futures. A discretionary account involves a variety of situations in which
the broker has discretion to trade for the customer's account. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275, 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867 (1972); see, e.g., Hirk v.
Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1977) (discretionary account is an
agency-for-hire); cf. Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706 at 22,871-72 (E.D. La. 1978) (commodity pool involves common
fund traded by an account executive). Several courts have held that a discretionary account
in commodity futures is also a security. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d
516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 488
(S.D. Iowa 1974); Berman v. Orinex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also Moody v. Bache & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. G. Weeks Securities, Inc., No. 79-2711 (W.D. Tenn. 1980). Contra, Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561
F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275, 279 (7th
Cir. 1972), Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, 467 F. Supp. 311, 317 (S.D. Ohio
1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 736 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Gravois v.
Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706 at
22,874-75 (E.D. La. 1978); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 512-14 (D.
Utah 1976). Although one court reasoned that the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction precludes application of securities laws to discretionary commodity trading accounts, Hofmayer
v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 736 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the '74 Act provides that the
Commission jurisdiction shall.not limit or supercede the SEC's jurisdiction. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2
(West Supp. 1979). See Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. Rav. 1 (1976). The Commission should have jurisdiction over discretionary accounts where the broker trades exclusively in commodity futures
or commodity options. See Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. RaP. CCH 1 20,706 at 22,873 (E.D. La. 1978) (purpose of Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to avoid regulatory conflict between Commission and SEC). Further, regulation of futures trading differs from regulation of securities trading because of the differences between a commodity future and a security. See Guttman, supra note 10, at 13 n.75.
A commodities futures contract or an option involving commodities terminates at a time
certain. Id. By contrast, a security is a certificate of tangible ownership which is permanent
in nature. Id. But see Long, Commodity Options-Revisited, 25 DRAKE L. Rav. 75, 130
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Long].
" A cash forward contract or a contract for deferred delivery is a fully negotiated commodity sales contract that provides for delivery of specific merchandise at a fixed price on a
specified subsequent date. See Clark, supra note 10, at 1179-98 (1978); see e.g., Cargill, Inc.
v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1971).
11 A transaction in foreign currency may involve exchange of cash for foreign currency,
or a contract for sale of the foreign currency for future delivery. CFTC v. American Board of
Trade, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see note 86 infra.
1" 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979).
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by applying the statutory definition of "commodity" to cash commodities

for deferred delivery,1" to contracts for deferred delivery which had the
characteristics of options" and to transactions in options involving foreign currency."9
In In re Stovall,20 the Commission distinguished a regulated futures
contract from a sale of a cash commodity for deferred delivery,2 which
the '74 Act excludes from regulation. 22 Stovall issued standardized con-

tracts in commodities for future delivery to investors.2 ' The Commission
staff charged that Stovall violated the '74 Act by not registering as a futures commission merchant.2 4 Stovall argued that he sold cash commodi-

ties for deferred delivery. The Commission rejected Stovall's argument
and held that Stovall's transactions substantively were contracts for the

sale of commodities for future delivery regulated by the '74 Act.2 ' The
Commission reasoned that Stovall directed his operation to the general
public and wrote standardized contracts28 which resembled futures contracts.2 7 Further, only one party actually took delivery of the physical
See text accompanying notes
18 See text accompanying notes
I' See text accompanying notes
2o [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
1979).
17

20-28 infra.
48-62 infra.
71-88 infra.
CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)

20,941 (CFTC Dec. 6,

21See note 14 supra.
22 See note 10 supra. Physical commodities are not commodities within the Commis-

sion's jurisdiction. Additionally, commodities are not securities within the SEC's jurisdiction. See Bromberg, supra note 10, at 221. Tangible commodities like corn, copper and cattle have inherent value, while securities are intangible and derive their value from the
success of the issuer. Id. at 222; see Ga. Sec. Comm'r, Release No. 4, BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 14,612 at 10,504 (items traded as commodities are tangible items, not securities).
Moreover, a futures contract involving commodities is not itself a security. Moody v. Bache
& Co., 570 F.2d 523, 525 (8th Cir. 1978); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, 467 F.
Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (commodity futures contract little more than wager that
market price will change by a specified date); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp.
669, 670-71 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129, 131 (N.D.
Cal. 1973); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Bromberg, supra note 10, at 222. But see Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 44
Cal. App. 3d 999, 119 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1975) (interpreting California and New
York law). An investment in a commodities future contract does not fall within the definition of a security because the contract does not represent an investment in a common enterprise. See Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1978). An investor in commodity futures expects profits solely from the speculation that the market price will change.
See note 6 supra.See generally 1978-1979 Securities Law Developments: What Is A Security?, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 846, 847, 848 (1979).
13 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,778. Stovall consistently promoted his operation as a means of speculating on changes in the price of cash
commodities. Id.
24 Id. at 23,776. The Commission charged Stovall with violating 7 U.S.C.A. § 6d (West
Supp. 1979) (any contract of sale of commodity must be made through designated contract
market).
25 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,777.
:6 See note 10 supra.
27 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,778-79.
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28
commodity under the contract.
The Commission balanced private buyers' and sellers' need to contract
in commodities free from federal regulation with the need of the general
public to be protected from potential abuses by those who publicly sell
standardized contracts. The parties to a negotiated contract for the sale
of a commodity for deferred delivery generally expect that the contract
will lead to an exchange of the commodity for money.29 The parties select
each other and fully negotiate the contract terms.30 By comparison, the
futures contract is a standardized instrument that hedgers and investors
buy from and sell to clearinghouses.3 1 Rarely expecting delivery, the spec32
ulators and hedgers do not negotiate the terms of futures contracts.
Speculators and investors rely instead on persons, such as advisors and
others associated with the clearinghouses over whom they have little
34

control.

Although nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended that the Commission regulate actual sales of goods for future delivery, 5 Congress did intend to regulate transactions involving contracts
like Stovall's. s The Commission formulated a reasonable test in Stovall
to detemine whether transactions involving a contract for future delivery
are within the Commission's jurisdiction.3 7 The critical factor is the par23 Id. at 23,779.
29 Id. at 23,778.
30 See note 14 supra.
See note 10 supra.
3' See Guttman, supra note 10, at 17. Actual delivery of the underlying commodity
involved in a futures contract takes place in only three percent of the contracts. Id. at 13.
Id. A clearinghouse is always party to the standardized futures contract. Id. at 16.
" See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEws 5843, 5859; note 131 infra.
15 Congress enacted the '74 Act to regulate futures markets, not private contracts between buyers and sellers. See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5843, 5858. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs
sales of commodities for deferred delivery where the parties reasonably expect that one
party will deliver the commodity to the other. See U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (present sale of future
goods operates as contract to sell); U.C.C. § 2-106(1); R.N. Kelly Cotton Merchant, Inc. v.
York, 494 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Taunton v. Allenberg Cotton Co., 378 F.
Supp. 34 (M.D. Ga. 1973) (contract to sell cotton not yet planted enforceable under UCC).
A buyer or seller who breaches a standardized futures contract with a clearinghouse might
argue that his obligation is not enforceable under the UCC, since the parties never intended
to deal in the physical commodity. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 1-201(3), 2-106(1), 2-501. The parties did agree, however, on all the terms to enforce the contract against each other. See
U.C.C. § 2-204; note 6 supra. If one party demands delivery and the other refuses, the former party may sue for damages under UCC § 2-711 (buyer's remedies); cf. U.C.C. § 2-703
(seller's remedies).
" See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18-20, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 5858-59; note 6 supra.
3 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. at 23,778. The Commission recognized that delivery may be deferred for purposes of convenience or necessity as long as the
underlying motivation for entering the contract is to acquire or dispose of the commodity.
Id.
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ties' general expectation of delivery of the underlying commodity.38 The
Commission may determine the parties' expectations by inquiring
whether the contract is issued to the general public with standardized
terms, and whether the parties have the ability to deliver or take delivery.39 Thus, where the circumstances surrounding a customer's transactions with a merchant indicate that the parties will not deal in the underlying commodity, the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over the
transactions is proper.
Refusing to be bound by the label Stovall placed on the contracts, the
Commission looked instead to the substance of Stovall's transactions. ° In
several recent cases dealing with commodity options, the Commission also
has emphasized substance over form by arguing that the defendants'
transactions were prohibited commodity options in substance even
though the defendants labeled them as deferred delivery contracts.41 Con-

gress granted the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over agreements having the character of an option.4 2 In the Futures Trading Act of 1978 ('78
Act), Congress prohibited transactions in commodity options 3 because
options are particularly subject to abuse. 44 Limited risk options are deceptively attractive to unsophisticated investors.' 5 In addition, the firms
offering options often employ boilerroom sales practices." Moreover, un- Id. at 23,778-79.
Id. See generally 1974 House Report, supra note 6, at 129.
40 See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
41 See, e.g., CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1151-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,901 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
42 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979).
43 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(c) & (d) (West Supp. 1979). 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(c) provides that no
person may enter into any commodity option transaction involving any commodity which
the Act regulates unless the commodity was regulated prior to the '74 Act, see note 2 supra,
or the Act or Commission provides an exemption. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(d); 17 C.F.R. § 32.12
(1979); [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,588 at 22,434 (Apr. 17,
1978) (Commission investigation of fraud in commodities industry). In the Futures Trading
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865, Congress amended the Commodities Exchange
Act by codifying Commission's Rule 32.11, 17 C.F.R. 32.11 (1979). 7 US.C.A. § 6(c) (West
Supp. 1979). Section 6c(c) codified Rule 32.11 which made it unlawful after June 1, 1978 for
any person to solicit or accept orders, money, or securities in connection with the purchase
or sale of any commodity option. See 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1979). See generally CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,901
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); note 12 supra. The Commission permits certain businesses to continue to
purchase options for use in connection with their business under the trade option exemption. See 17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1979).
14 See CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. at 1155. See also
CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 120,901 at 23,659-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); CFTC v. American Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp.
1177, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
41 468 F. Supp. at 1155; see Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346, 349 (W.D. Mich. 1977)
(ease of market entry for investors has attracted fly-by-night organizations).
4643 Fed. Reg. 16,153, reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 20,588 (Apr. 17, 1978) (Commission investigation of fraud in the industry). Issuers
39
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like the market for commodity futures, trading in commodity options
47
serves no significant economic or commercial purpose.

In CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Corp.,'8 Metals Depository Corporation (MDC) sold to the general public what MDC labeled as
contracts for deferred delivery of gold and silver. 49 Purchasers paid MDC
a fee for the right to buy certain amount of bullion for subsequent delivery.5 0 MDC placed orders with an overseas bank to cover each sale.1 The
Commission complained that MDC had entered into contracts having the
character of prohibited option transactions. 5 2 The MDC court held that
MDC's deferred delivery contracts were sales of options and that MDC
violated the '78 Act by selling the options.5 3 The district court noted that
Congress granted the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over agreements,
including any transaction having the character of an option." The MDC
court differentiated options from deferred delivery and futures contracts.55 Deferred delivery and futures contracts are transferable contractual agreements to buy or sell a fixed amount and grade of a certain commodity on a specified date.5 6 By comparison, a commodity option confers
upon the holder the right to buy or sell either a specified amount of a
commodity or a futures contract within a certain period of time at a given
price. 57 The court enumerated three functional distinctions between options and futures contracts.58 Sellers of options charge an initial
of options bombarded the public with phone solicitations and promotional material. S. RsP.
No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2100;
see, e.g., note 63 infra (boilerroom operation).
41 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,588 at 22,434; cf. note 6
supra (economic benefits of futures exchanges).
46 468 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
49 468 F. Supp. at 1151-52.
'0 Id. at 1154.

1 Id.
52 Id. at 1152.

" Id. at 1153-54. Since the transactions in MDC had the character of options, MDC
violated the Futures Trading Act by not filing for an exemption or registering under the
Futures Trading Act. Id. at 1154; see note 43 supra.
" 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979). The Commission's jurisdiction includes jurisdiction over transactions having the character of an "option," "privilege," "indemnity," "bid,"
"put," "call," "advance guaranty" or "decline guarantee." Id.; see CFTC v. Crown Colony
Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
56 468 F. Supp. at 1155. The contracts which defendant MDC described as deferred
delivery contracts were considered by the MDC court to be futures contracts. But see text
accompanying notes 20-39 supra (differences between deferred delivery contracts and futures contracts).
Id.; see notes 10, 14 & 43 supra.
468 F. Supp. at 1155. Accord, CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434
F. Supp. 911, 913-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see British American Commodity Options Corp. v.
Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 484-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 938 (1977); Gravois v.
Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. Fur. L. Rm. (CCH) 20,706, at
22,870 n.3 (E.D. La. 1978). See generally Bromberg, supra note 10, at 256-59; Long, supra
note 13.
" 468 F. Supp. at 1155.
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nonrefundable premium to cover the sellers' commissions and costs,5 9
whereas purchasers of futures contracts pay a "down payment" which the
issuer applies against the ultimate sales price.60 An option holder is not
obligated to take possession of the commodity, while a holder of a futures
contract is so obligated.1 Purchasers of an option contract make a profit
only when the price of the commodity increases beyond the initial premium paid to the seller, while purchasers of futures contracts make a
profit when the sales price of the right to future delivery exceeds the
purhcase price.2
The MDC court held that the investments sold by MDC were commodity options since the investments met all three option characteristics.6 3 The MDC court considered the substance of a transaction over

form." The congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction over agreements
59 The seller's initial charge for purchasing an option is often called a "contango fee."
Id. The contango fee does not give the purchaser any equity in the underlying commodity.
CFTC v. Goldex Int'l Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,839
(N.D. IlL 1979).
" 468 F. Supp. at 1155.
01 Id.
42

468 F. Supp. at 1155.

'3 Id. The MDC court held that the illegal sales of options in violation of Rule 32.11
would justify enjoining MDC from further sales. Id. However, the court also evaluated
MDC's activities under the antifraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act. MDC
trained its salesmen to use high-pressure sales techniques. The salesmen made an estimated
16,000 telephone calls a week to investors with whom the salesmen had no previous contacts. The salesmen frequently followed-up the phone calls by sending misleading pamphlets which understated the risks of investing in the gold market. The court permanently
enjoined the defendant's boilerroom operation. 468 F. Supp. at 1157-63; see 7 U.S.C.A. §
13a-1 (West Supp. 1979); 17 C.F.R. 32.9 (1979). See also CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346
(W.D. Mich. 1977). The MDC court ordered MDC to disgorge its illegal profits. 468 F. Supp.
at 1163.
468 F. Supp. at 1154. Accord, CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 120,901 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Morgan, Harris
court relied on the three-prong test of MDC to distinguish between options and futures
contracts. The defendants in Morgan, Harris sold contracts for deferred delivery of commodities, including gold, silver, platinum, copper and various foreign currencies. Id. at
23,657. Purchasers of the contracts paid a transaction fee to gain "control" of a specified
commodity for a specified term. The defendant sellers did not inform the customers that the
fee was a nonrefundable premium providing no equity in the contract. The purchaser could
take delivery of the commodity by rendering the full purchase price of the contract, in addition to the previously paid transaction fee. A purchaser could also liquidate or abandon his
contract. The purchaser forfeited the entire transaction fee when he abandoned the contract. Although the verifications the defendant sellers issued to the purchasers contained a
cancellation clause, the purchaser could not enforce the clause since it contained a one-day
limitation. The purchasers' only risk was the fee paid. Id. at 23,657-60. The district court
disregarded the self-serving nomenclature that the defendants placed on the contracts and
held that the contracts were commodity options. Id. at 23,660 (citing CFTC v. United States
Metals Depository Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). See also CFTC v. Goldex Int'l
Ltd., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,839 (N.D. Ill. 1979); note
65 supra.
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having the character of, or known in the trade 5 as, an option, and the
general ban on option trading suggest that the courts and the Commission should interpret the definition of options broadly."6 Sellers of options
often deceive unsophisticated investors6 7 through the use of boilerroom
sales techniques"' and the failure to disclose that the initial fee is
nonrefundable.69 The functional test that the MDC court applied to
MDC's transactions ° should aid the Commission's crusade to enforce the
intent of Congress to deter widespread abuses in the sale of commodity
options to the public.
The prohibition on trading in options was again at issue in CFTC v.
American Board of Trade, Inc. 71 In American Board of Trade, the defen-

dants dealt in silver bulion, silver coin, gold bullion and various foreign
currency options.7 ' The defendants conceded that the transactions were
in commodity options,72 but one defendant argued that options based on
spot and cash markets were beyond the scope of the '74 Act.7 4 The court
in American Board of Trade rejected the defendant's argument.7

5

The

court reasoned that the statutes proscribing option transactions are not
confined to options involving commodity futures. 76 The statute proscribing option trading prohibits "any commodity option transaction involving
"' In CFTC v. Goldex Int'l Ltd., the court noted that the '74 Act incorporates the trade
knowledge and definition of a commodity option. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Com. Futr.
L. REP. (CCH) 20,839 (N.D. IlM. 1979). Goldex sold contracts for "deferred delivery" of
various commodities. Id. at 23,439. The Goldex contract conferred upon the purchaser the
right, but not the obligation, to buy a specified quantity of gold, silver, or platinum bullion
or coins, at a fixed price on or before a specified date..Id. at 23,440. The Goldex investor
realized no profit unless the market value of the commodity exceeded the sum of the contract price and the contango fee (selling costs). Id. at 23,440-41; see note 59 supra. Based on
expert testimony, the court held that the Goldex contracts met the trade definition of commodity option, regardless of the title Goldex placed on the contracts. Id. at 23,441.
"See note 43 supra. See generally Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission:A Review of the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAW. 1755, 1766 (1979); Commodity
Futures Antifraud, supra note 6, at 907 (1977).
6 See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
See, e.g., note 63 supra.

6,See note 59 supra.

See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
473 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
'2 Id. at 1180, 1181. The defendants in American Board of Trade included American
Board of Trade, Inc. and affiliated corporations and officers. Id. at 1178. See also note 15
supra.
73 Id. at 1181. The American Board of Trade defendants had neither registered with
the Commission nor filed for an exemption as required when transacting in commodity options. Id. See notes 12 & 43 supra.
7' Id. at 1181. Defendant Economou was president of American Board of Trade, Inc. Id.
at 1177, 1178 n.6.
" Id. a 1182. Economou argued that interpreting the '74 Act to proscribe option transactions based on spot and cash markets would interfere with antitrust laws. Id. at 1182 n.14;
see 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). See also Rosenthal v. Bagley, 450 F. Supp. 120, 1124-25 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (rejecting argument that Commission jurisdiction interferred with antitrust laws).
76 473 F. Supp. at 1182. See generally text accompanying notes 6-16 supra.
70
71
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any commodity... .,,7 The court concluded that, despite the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's name, the '74 Act authorizes the Commission to regulate more than transactions in commodity futures. 78 The
Commission may regulate transactions in any commodity option involving any commodity.
The defendants also asserted that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over option transactions pertaining to foreign currency.7 9 The defendants based this argument on the statutory provision that nothing in
the '74 Act applies to transactions in foreign currency.80 The American
Board of Trade court rejected the defendants' interpretation of the statutory limitation.8 1 The court held that options involving the sale of foreign
currency for future delivery are within the scope of the '74 Act. 2 The
court distinguished between a contract for the underlying foreign currency and a transaction in options which only involves the foreign currency.8 3 The American Board of Trade court reasoned that an option
transaction involving a commodity is far removed from a transaction in
that commodity. The parties to a transaction in foreign currency anticipate delivery of the foreign currency when one party pays the price.8 By
contrast, the court noted that the parties to an option involving foreign
currency initially anticipate that the option purchaser will decide whether
to exercise his right.8 5 The option only involves the foreign currency.86
The court further reasoned that the option purchaser might allow his option to expire by not acting when the specified date arrives.8 7 Once the
option purchaser decides to exercise his right, the option becomes a transaction in the foreign currency. The Commission has jurisdiction until the
purchaser exercises his right.8 8
7

7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(c) (West Supp. 1979). See note 12 supra.

71 473 F. Supp. at 1183.

Id. at 1182.
" 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 states that nothing in the Act governs transactions in
foreign currency, security warrants or rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages, unless such transactions involve the sale
of foreign currency for future delivery conducted on a board of trade. Id.
81 473 F. Supp. at 1183.
7

82

Id.

" Id. at 1182-83.
0 Id.

Id.
Id. The American Board of Trade court noted that the '74 Act does not exempt
options involving foreign currency. Id. at 1183. Section 6c(b) specifically applies to transactions which involve any commodity regulated under the Act and which are of the character
of an "option." 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1976). See also 7 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1976). In passing the '74
Act, Congress noted that trading in foreign currency was supervised adequately by bank
regulatory agencies. See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5843, 5863.
a 473 F. Supp. at 1183.
473 F. Supp. at 1182. The American Board of Trade court issued a preliminary injunction from further dealings in commodity options. Id. at 1184. The defendants argued
that § 6c(d) violated their due process rights. Id. cf. 7 U.S.C.A. 6c(d) (West Supp. 1979)
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The district court in American Board of Trade properly held that the
Commission could regulate options involving commodities even though
the commodity contracts were not for future delivery.89 Under the American Board of Trade analysis, an option is comparable to a simple futures
contract.90 Purchasers dealing in either an option or a futures contract do
not generally expect to deal in the underlying commodity.9 1 The option or
futures contract only involves the underlying commodity.92 The difference
between a futures contract and an option lies in the investor's obligation
to take delivery.9 3 An option does not obligate the holder to take delivery.
A futures contract compels the investor to take delivery, unless he re9
versed his position by selling what he bought or buying what he sold. '
Although Congress broadly defined a commodity, Congress specifically
exempted commodity transactions where the parties anticipate delivery
of the physical commodity 5 at the time of contracting.9 ' If a purchaser
expects that payment of the purchase price will result in delivery of the
foreign currency, then the transaction is in the foreign currency and is
thus exempted from the Commission's regulation.9 7 Similarly, if the parties expect delivery of the underlying commodity at the time they strike a
contract, then the transaction is a sale of the physical commodity, not a
(grantors with a net worth of $5,000,000 or more exempted); 17 C.F.R. § 32.12 (1979) (Commission lowered minimum net worth requirement to $1,000,000). The defendants contended
that a requirement that grantors have a net worth of $5,000,000 is without rational basis.
473 F. Supp. at 1184. The court rejected this contention, holding that it was reasonable for
Congress to find that persons with a net worth of $5,000,000 are less likely to be of questionable financial stability than persons with less net worth. Id.
89 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979); CFTC v. American Board of Trade, Inc., 473
F. Supp. at 1183 (American Board of Trade's options traded on various exchanges within
Commission's jurisdiction which extends to contracts executed on any board of trade). The
court in American Board of Trade stated that a purchase or sale of an option is not a
transaction in the foreign currency but a transaction in options. 473 F. Supp. at 1183 n.17.
Accord, CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978). In Muller, the Fifth Circuit held
that options on futures contracts traded in London involve foreign commerce within the '74
Act. 570 F.2d at 1297. The Muller court noted that under § 2, "interstate commerce" includes commerce between foreign states. 570 F.2d at 1299 (citing 7 U.S.C.A. § 3). See also In
re The Siegel Trading Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,862
(CFTC July 27, 1977) (futures contract in Mexican pesos concerns a market in interstate
commerce for purposes of Commission jurisdiction).
" One court has stated that a commodity futures contract is an option. McCurnin v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 477 F.2d 113
(5th Cir. 1973); see Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1978).
"i See notes 32 & 64 supra.
" The Commission clearly has jusrisdiction over the trading of commodity futures contracts involving commodities. See note 13 supra. See also 537 SEC. REG. & L. REP. E-3, E-5
(1980) (Commission's argument for jurisdiction over Value Line Composite Average).
93 See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
" Id.
'7 See notes 22 & 33 supra.
97

See text accompanying notes 20-31 supra.
See text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
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futures contract within the Commission's regulation. 9 State and federal
law prior to the enactment of the '74 Act adequately regulate transactions
in physical commodities and foreign currencies.9 9 Recent interpretations
of the '74 Act's scope, therefore, have supported the '74 Act's desire to
lessen the potential for abuses in the commodity options markets.
B.

Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Commodities Acts*

Trading in commodity futures contracts 00 has increased dramatically
in recent years.' 0 ' Expanded trade in such contracts provides significant
economic benefits 0 2 but increases opportunities for commodity price manipulation, fraud and other deceptive trading practices. 03 In an effort to
98 See text accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
See notes 35 & 86 supra.
* Since the writing of this subsection, the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have
determined that an implied private right of action exists under the Commodity Exchange
Act. See Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. Furr. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,051 at 24,189 (2d Cir. July 8,
1980); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,030 at 24,063 (6th Cir. May 12, 1980). But see Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) at 24,190- 24,219 (Mansfield, J. dissenting); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 24,068 (Phillips, J. dissenting).
100 A commodity futures contract is a standardized agreement to purchase or sell a
fixed amount of a commodity of a certain grade at a certain future date for a variable price.
See Note, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 73 MICH. L. REV. 710, 711 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Role of Commodity Futures Trading Commission]; see, e.g., United States Cotton
Futures Act, 7 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) (statutory cotton futures contract terms). Commodity
futures contracts are traded on commodity exchanges, or contract markets, by registered
futures commission merchants and floor brokers. See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); 7 U.S.C.A. § 6f
(West Supp. 1979); Role of Commodity Futures Trading Commission, supra at 711-15. See
generally 1978 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 3-13, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2093-101 (brief history of commodities trading and regulation); Note, Private Rights of
Action for Commodity Futures Investors, 55 B.U. L. REv. 804, 806-08 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Investors] (summary of commodity futures trading business); note 102 infra.
101 See 1978 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 13, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2101. Total trading volume in commodity futures contracts rose from 9.5 million contracts
in 1967 to 42.1 million contracts in 1977. Id., [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2101.
The dollar value of commodities trading in the futures market increased from approximately $500 billion in 1976 to $1 trillion in 1977. Id., [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2101.
102 See Report of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Advisory Committee on
the Economic Role of Contract Markets 11-13 (July 17, 1976). Economic benefits of futures
trading include accurate commodity pricing, efficient resource allocation and opportunity for
risk-shifting or hedging. Id. Commodities purchasers can contract for future delivery of
goods to coincide with projected needs. Producers and consumers can shift the risk of commodity price fluctuation to speculators who accept the risk in return for an opportunity to
profit from favorable commodity price movement. See id. See generally Greenstone, The
CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving Regulatory Independence, 33 Bus.
LAw. 163, 171-77 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Greenstone]; Purcell & Valdez, The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Regulating Legislation for Commodity Futures
Trading in a Market-Oriented Economy, 21 S.D. L. REv. 555, 559-65 (1976).
103 See Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U. L.
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stabilize expanding commodity markets and curb trading abuses,1 04 Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
('74 Act),1°0 which significantly amended the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA or Act). 106 The '74 Act established the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (Commission)107 and granted the Commission broad regulatory and enforcement power over commodity trading.10 The Futures
REv. 1, 18-35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hudson] (discussion of churning, unauthorized
trading, manipulation, and other deceptive practices). See generally McDermott, Defining
Manipulationin Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze", 74 NEv. U. L. REv.
202 (1979).
104 See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5844, 5856. Prior to enacting the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 ('74
Act), see note 105 infra, Congress found that commodity futures were traded in large volume by the general public, as well as by persons engaged in buying and selling agricultural
commodities in interstate commerce. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18, [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5856; see note 101 supra. Congress also found that transactions
and prices in the commodities industry were susceptible to speculation, manipulation and
control, and sudden, unreasonable price fluctuations. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at
18, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5856. Such manipulation and variation in dayto-day market transactions burdened interstate commerce and created the need for regulation. Id., [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5856. Congress enacted the '74 Act to
insure fair practice and honest dealing on commodity exchanges and to control speculation
in order to prevent injury to producers, consumers and the exchanges themselves. Id., [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at 5856; see 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (codification of legislative
findings and purpose).
"' Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 101-418, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24
(1976)). The '74 Act established the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission)
and granted the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading in all commodities.
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4a (1976). The '74 Act also established an elaborate enforcement scheme
for the CEA. See id. §§ 7a, 7b, 8, 13a, 13a-1, 18; text accompanying notes 115-18 infra. See
generally 1978 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 10-13, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
at 2098-101 (summary of '74 Act); Role of Commodity Futures Trading Commission, supra
note 100, at 718-19.
106 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-24 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979); see 1978 Senate Report, supra note 8,
at 7-13, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2095-101 (history of CEA).
101 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a (West Supp. 1979). The Commission is an independent federal
regulatory agency charged with overseeing commodity futures trading and enforcing the
CEA. Id. The Commission is composed of five members appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. Id. Commissioners serve staggered five year terms. Id.
The '74 Act encourages the President to select Commissioners with expertise in futures
trading. Id. See generally Greenstone, supra note 102, at 164, 185-201 (legislative history of
Commission); Role of Commodity Futures Trading Commission, supra note 100.
108 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 7b, 9, 13a, 13a-1 (1976). The Commission may suspend or
revoke an exchange's right to operate if the exchange fails or refuses to comply with the
CEA or the rules, regulations and orders promulgated by the Commission thereunder. Id. §
7b. The Commission may also bring administrative proceedings against any contract market
that fails to enforce its rules, Commission regulations, or the Act. Id. § 13a. If the Commission has reason to believe that any person has manipulated the market price of a commodity
or commodity futures contract, has made a material misrepresentation in filings with the
Commission, or otherwise has violated the Act, the Commission may enjoin future violations, suspend or revoke such person's right to trade, and assess a civil penalty of not more
than $100,000 for each violation. Id. § 9. The Commission or the Attorney General may
bring an action in federal district court to enjoin violations of the Act or to enforce compli-
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Trading Act of 1978 ('78 Act)109 further amended the CEA and granted
the states enforcement power to protect the interests of state residents
under the Act.110 Congress has not, however, expressly provided private
plaintiffs with a federal cause of action to remedy violations of the
whether the Act imCEA.111 Thus, the courts have sought to determine
12
pliedly provides a private right of action.1
Prior to enactment of the '74 Act, several courts found an implied private cause of action under antifraud provisions of the CEA.1 23 The recent

'74 Act and '78 Act amendments to the CEA have been so extensive, however, that courts question whether the previously recognized implied
cause of action has survived the amendments. 1 4 The '74 Act created a
ance with the Act's provisions. Id. § 13a-1. See Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd.
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000, 23,881-82 (N.D. IM.Jan. 8,
1980).
I" Pub. L. No. 95-405, §§ 2-28, 92 Stat. 865 (1978) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-24
(West Supp. 1979)). The '78 Act provides that persons registered under the CEA may establish voluntary associations for regulating the trading practices of association members. See 7
U.S.C.A. § 21 (West Supp. 1979). The FTA creates a cause of action in favor of the states
which may seek, on behalf of residents, injunctive relief from CEA violations. See id. § 13a2. Under the '78 Act, Congress also amended the CEA to prohibit options trading in certain
commodities. See id. § 6c(c). See generally Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd. [19771980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,000, 23,882 (N.D, IM. Jan. 8, 1980);
1978 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 1-4, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2089-92
(synopsis of '78 Act); Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures Trading Commission. A Review of the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAw. 1755 (1979).
110 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-2 (West Supp. 1979). If the interests of state residents appear
to have been threatened or affected adversely by violations of the Act, a state may bring an
action in federal district court on behalf of state residents to enjoin such violations, to enforce compliance with the Act, and to recover damages. Id.
" See generallyAlken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980); Stone v. Saxon &
Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,000
(N.D. IM. Jan. 8, 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
See, e.g., Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980) (recognized implied private right of action); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000 at 23,885 (N.D. IlM.Jan. 8, 1980) (no
implied private right of action); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (no implied private right of action); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 107-08
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (recognized implied private cause of action). See generally Hudson, supra
note 103, at 39-40; Investors, supra note 100, at 815-26 (analysis of implied private right of
action under CEA prior to Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
I's See, e.g., Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir.), rev'd on
other ground sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Booth
v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970); Goodman v. H. Hentz &
Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. IM. 1967). Goodman first recognized an implied private
remedy for commodity fraud. Id. The Goodman court, drawing an analogy to § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), and the implied private
right of action thereunder, found an implied cause of action under 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976). 265
F. Supp. at 447.
114 See, e.g., Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980); National
Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter
& Co., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 733, 737 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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broad enforcement scheme for the CEA. As a result, the Act provides administrative reparations proceedings in which any person aggrieved by violations of the Act may seek compensation for damages.11 5 In addition,
commodity exchanges must provide equitable procedures for settlement
of customer complaints against the exchanges and their employees. " The
'74 Act also granted the Commission broad regulatory control over commodity trading and the power to enforce provisions of the Act. " The '78
Act provided the states with standing to seek judicial protection of state
residents' interests under the Act. 18 In light of the express remedial protections which are now afforded producers, consumers and investors
under the CEA, the existence of an implied private right of action under
the Act is currently in doubt." 9
In Cort v. Ash,120 the Supreme Court outlined a four part analysis to
"s 7 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West Supp. 1979); see Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7-8
(D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000 at 23,881-82 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Hudson, supra note 103, at 37-38; Rosen,
Reparation Proceedingsunder the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1005-56
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Rosen]. Persons aggrieved by violations of the CEA may seek a
reparations hearing before the Commission. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West Supp. 1979). If the Commission determines that the CEA has been violated by a person registered under the Act,
the Commission may assess damages and order the offender to make reparation to the aggrieved party. Id. § 18(e). The Commission's order is enforceable in federal district court
and reviewable in the federal courts of appeals. Id. § 18(f), (g). Several courts have concluded that administrative reparations proceedings are merely an alternative to an implied
private cause of action under the Act See, e.g., Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 8
(D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 114 (N.D. IMl.1979). Within the
jurisdiction of such courts, a person aggrieved by violations of the Act might choose to proceed in federal district court pursuant to his implied right of action or appear before the
Commission in a reparations proceeding. Id.
"1
7 U.S.C.A. § 7a(11) (West Supp. 1979); see Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000 at 23,882 (N.D. IMI.Jan 8,
1980) (review of '74 Act enforcement provisions); Hudson, supra note 103, at 36-37; Rosen,
supra note 115, at 1010-14. The CEA requires contract markets to provide arbitration proceedings or any other fair and equitable procedure for settlement of customer complaints. 7
U.S.C.A. § 7a(11) (West Supp. 1979). Such proceedings, however, are not available to resolve
customer claims in excess of $15,000 and are not binding except as agreed between the parties. Id. Administrative reparations proceedings are available as an alternative to arbitration. See id. § 18 (West Supp. 1979).
117 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 7b, 9, 13a, 13a-1 (1976); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000 at 23,881-82 (N.D. M11.
Jan.
8, 1980) (review of Commission enforcement power); note 108 supra.
I18 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-2 (West Supp. 1979); see Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,000 at 23,882 (N.D. ]MI.Jan. 8,
1980); note 110 supra.
1'9 See Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fur. L. REP. (CCH) %21,000 at 23,885 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co.,
481 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. Tex. 1979); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile
Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
120422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort plaintiff brought suit against a corporation and its
directors for violations of federal election laws. Id. at 70-72. Federal election law did not
provide an express remedy for violations of election law provisions. The plaintiff, a share-
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assist courts in determining whether federal law implies a private cause of
action. 121 A court must determine whether the plaintiff is one of a class
for whose special benefit the federal statute was enacted; whether Congress intended to create or deny a private remedy under the statute;
whether implication of a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and whether the private remedy sought is
one traditionally relegated to state law.1 22 Applying the Cort analysis, federal courts nevertheless have disagreed on the implication of a private
remedy under the CEA.12 3 Recent Supreme Court decisions in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington1 2 4 and TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis12 5 have narrowed the focus of the Cort analysis. Although some
semblance of the Cort four-part test remains intact after these decisions,
the Supreme Court has indicated that legislative intent, derived princiholder of the defendant corporation, nevertheless sought both damages and injunctive relief
through a private action. Id. The primary purpose of the election law was to control corporate influence over federal elections. Id. at 82. Protection of corporate shareholders was a
purely secondary effect of the statute. Id. The Court found no legislative intent to create a
private right of action under the statute and questioned the effect of recognizing an implied
private remedy on the statutory enforcement scheme. Id. at 82-84. Finally, the Court noted
that ultra vires acts of corporations were traditionally concerns of state law. Id. at 84. The
Supreme Court, therefore, refused to recognize an implied private right in favor of the
plaintiff under the federal election law. Id. at 85. See generally 1978-1979 Securities Law
Developments: Implied Private Rights of Action, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 944 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Implied Private Rights].
121 422 U.S. at 78; see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242,
245-49 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-79 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-709 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 34-41 (1977). See generally Note, Implication of PrivateActions from Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. Coitp. LAw 371, 382-88 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Implication
of Private Actions]; Implied Private Rights, supra note 120, at 945-46.
,,"Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78; see note 121 supra.
'23 Compare National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 470 F.
Supp. 1256, 1259-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no implied private remedy); Berman v. Bache, Halsey,
Stuart, Shield, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 322-23 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (no implied private remedy)
with Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 113-19 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (private right of action
implied).
12 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The question addressed in Redington was whether customers of
a securities brokerage firm have an implied right of action against brokerage firm auditors
based on misstatements contained in brokerage firm financial reports filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) under § 17(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
442 U.S. at 562-67. Analyzing legislative intent, the Court concluded that § 17(a) implies no
private remedy. Id. at 568-79; see Implied Private Rights, supra note 121, at 950-51; text
accompanying notes 128-37 infra.
I's
100 S.Ct. 242, 245-49 (1979). In Transamerica,the plaintiff, a shareholder of a real
estate investment trust, brought shareholder derivative and class action suits aginst the
trust, individual trustees and the trust's investment advisor for violations of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1979). Id. at
243-44. The Court considered whether a private right of action existed under the IAA to
remedy violations of IAA provisions. Id. Based on the statutory language and the legislative
history of the IAA, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to create a private
right of action under the IAA. Id. at 245-49. The Court disposed of the case merely by
determining legislative intent. Id. at 249; see text accompanying notes 138-48 infra.
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pally from statutory language and legislative history, is determinative of
the existence of implied private remedies under federal law. 28 Unfortunately, the "legislative intent" test of Redington and Transamericahas
failed to resolve the courts' disagreement on implication of a private right
12 7
of action under the CEA.
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, the Supreme Court considered
whether an implied right of action exists under section 17(a), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). 28 Analysis of congressional intent determines the existence of implied private remedies under federal
law. 2 " Although Cort set forth four factors considered relevant in determining legislative intent, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Cort factors are not necessarily entitled to equal weight.3 0 The Redington Court

limited analysis of legislative intent to consideration of the first and second Cort tests.' 31 The Court considered whether plaintiffs were members
of the class sought to be protected by section 17(a),' 3 2 the language of
section 17(a), 33 the legislative history of the section,3-4 and the statutory
12' See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 245-49 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 568-79 (1979); notes 124 & 125 supra; text
accompanying notes 128-48 infra. Legislative intent, as defined in Transamericaand Redington, is determined by analysis of the first two Cort factors. See 100 S. Ct. at 245-49; 442
U.S. at 568-79. The analysis does not, however, necessarily accord each of the Cort factors
equal weight. See 100 S. Ct. at 249; 442 U.S. at 575-76. Statutory language and legislative
history are the principal determinants of legislative intent. See 100 S. Ct. at 245-49; 442
U.S. at 568-79.
'17 Compare Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000 (N.D. I1. Jan. 8, 1980) (no implied private remedy
under §§ 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the Act); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (no implied private remedy under § 4b of the Act) with Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023
(D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980) (implied private remedy exists under § 4b of the Act). See generally
text accompanying notes 150-229 infra.
128 442 U.S. at 563-67.
129 Id. at 568; see note 126 supra.
130 442 U.S. at 575.
"I'Id. at 568-74. The Court concluded that plaintiffs were not members of the class
sought to be protected by § 17(a) and found no support in the language of § 17(a), the
legislative history or the statutory scheme of the '34 Act for the proposition that Congress
intended to create a private remedy under § 17(a). Id. at 575-76. The Court therefore considered analysis of the third and fourth Cort factors unnecessary. See id.; text accompanying note 122 supra; note 135 infra.
132 See 442 U.S. at 569-71. Section 17(a) expressly protects investors. Id. at 569. The
term "investors" includes only purchasers and sellers of securities. Id. at 574. Since the
Redington plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities, the Supreme Court
concluded that the plaintiffs were not members of the class sought to be protected by §
17(a). Id. at 576.
133 442 U.S. at 568-71. The Redington Court concluded that the language of § 17(a) of
the '34 Act did not purport to create a private right of action. Id. at 571. Section 17(a)
contained no prohibition on which an implied right of action could be founded. Id. at 569.
Congress intended § 17(a) to provide the SEC with information required to monitor the
financial health of regulated broker-dealers. Id. at 569-70. The language of § 17(a) provided
no basis for inferring the existence of a private right of action. Id. at 571.
132 442 U.S. at 571. The legislative history of the '34 Act is entirely silent on the availa-
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scheme of the '34 Act. 3 5 The Court found no legislative intent to provide
a private remedy under section 17(a). 3s Since analysis of the first two
Cort factors indicated no private action under section 17(a), the Court
declined to consider whether implication of a private remedy was necessary to effectuate the purpose of section 17(a) or whether
the private rem37
edy sought was traditionally relegated to state law.2
The Supreme Court decision in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis followed closely after Redington: The Transamerica case
involved claims under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.138 The Supreme Court considered whether section 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act created an implied private right of action in.favor of persons aggrieved by violations of Investment Advisers Act provisions.23 9 As in Redington, the Court limited inquiry to a determination of legislative intent
based on the language of the statute and legislative history.140 Unlike the
statute considered in Redington, section 206 expressly prohibited certain
activity. 41 Although the Court found that section 206 clearly evidenced
bility of a private remedy under § 17(a). Id.
35 442 U.S. at 571-74. Sections 9(e), 16(b) and 18(a) of the '34 Act expressly grant
private causes of action. Id. at 571-72. Congress certainly could have created a private remedy under § 17(a). Id. at 572. Section 18(a) of the '34 Act also provides a remedy for a
certain class of individuals harmed by violations of the type alleged by the Redington plaintiffs. Id. at 572-73; see note 132 supra. The Supreme Court was therefore reluctant to recognize an implied private cause of action which would protect a broader class of individuals
than that sought to be protected by Congress. Id. at 574.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court considered the statutory enforcement
scheme of Title IX in connection with its analysis of the third Cort factor. 441 U.S. 677,
704-08 (1979). The Cannon Court phrased the third Cort test as whether implication of a
private remedy was "necessary or at least helpful to accomplishment of [Title IX's] purpose." Id. at 703; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). Although not applying the third
Cort test, the Redington court defined the third Cort test as whether implication of a private cause of action was "necessary to 'effectuate the purpose of the [federal law in question]."' 442 U.S. at 575. In Transamerica,the third Cort test was further modified. See 100
S. Ct. at 249. The TransamericaCourt declined to consider the "utility" of a private remedy
under section 17(a) of the IAA. Id.
The Redington Court may have declined to describe its consideration of the statutory
enforcement scheme of the '34 Act under the guise of applying the third Cort test in order
to avoid express inconsistency with the Cannon decision.
"3 442 U.S. at 575-76.
137

Id. at 576.

15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976); see note 125 supra. Congress enacted the IAA
to deal with abuses in the investment industry. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 243 (1979).
13 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 243 (1979). The
Transamericaplaintiffs, shareholders of a real estate investment trust, brought derivative
and class action suits against the trust, individual trustees, and the trust's investment advisor. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were guilty of fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty. Id. at 244. Plaintiffs sought an injunction, recission of the advisory contract, and damages. Id.
"0 See id. at 245-48; text accompanying note 126 supra.
141 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Section 206 of the IAA is a broad prohibition of fraudulent
activity by investment advisors. See 100 S. Ct. at 245-46.
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congressional intent to create enforceable fiduciary obligations between
an investment advisor and his clients, 14 2 Congress did not necessarily intend enforcement of such obligations through a private cause of action in
federal court. 143 Since Congress had expressly provided judicial and administrative methods for enforcing compliance with section 206,' the
Court reasoned that Congress had not simply forgotten to mention an
intended private remedy.' 4 Certainly Congress knew how to create such a
remedy.' 46 Therefore, the failure of Congress to provide an express private right of action strongly suggested that Congress did not intend to
include a private damage remedy within the enforcement provisions of
4
the Investment Advisers Act."
7 The determination of congressional in48
tent disposed of the case.1

Since the Supreme Court decisions in Redington and Transamerica,
several district courts have reconsidered implication of a private right of
action under the CEA. "9 In Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 50° plaintiff
Fischer, who held a commodity brokerage account with the defendant
142 100 S. Ct. at 246. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that § 206 creates
"federal fiduciary standards" to govern the conduct of investment advisors. See id.; Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11(1977).
143 100 S. Ct. at 246. Even though the IAA creates certain investment advisor fiduciary
obligations, the IAA is silent on the question whether an individual amy utilize an implied
private right of action to enforce the fiduciary obligations. Id.
'4 See id. at 247. Section 209 of the IAA authorizes administrative enforcement of IAA
provisions in federal court. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976). Section 203 imposes administrative
sanctions on persons violating the IAA. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1976). Section 217 makes
willful violation of the IAA a criminal offense, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment See
15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976). The Transamerica Court noted that "when a statute limits a
thing to be done in a particular mode, [the statute] includes the negative of any other
mode." 100 S. Ct. at 247 (quoting Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).
The Court, however, conceded that "settled rules of statutory construction could yield...
to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent." 100 S. Ct. at 247.
145 100 S. Ct. at 247. The Court cited Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). In his Cannon dissent, Mr. Justice Powell argued that the
Cort analysis canot be squared with the doctrine of separation of powers and that the Supreme Court should reappraise the standards for judicial implication of private rights of
action. Id. at 730. The Cort analysis is an open invitation to judicial legislation. Id. at 731.
Since Cort, no fewer than twenty decisions by the courts of appeals have found implied
private causes of action under federal statutes. Id. at 741. Justice Powell concluded that
Congress could not have simply forgotten to mention an intended private right of action in
each of these cases. Id. at 742. Thus, the courts "should not condone the implication of any
private action from a federal statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in
fact intended such an action to exist." Id. at 749.
146 100 S. Ct. at 248 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. at 572.).
147 100 S. Ct. at 248.
148 Id. at 249.
149 See, e.g., Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980) (implied
private right of action); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000 at 23,885 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1980) (no implied
private remedy); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (no
implied private remedy).
150 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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brokerage firm, complained that the defendant had sold commodity futures contracts contrary to plaintiff's express directions.5 1 Fischer based
his claim in part on section 4b of the CEA, an antifraud provision of the
Act. 152 Applying a modified Cort analysis, the Fischer court determined
that Congress had not intended to provide a private remedy under section 4b and denied Fischer standing to sue.1 53
The court conceded that Fischer might be a member of the class
sought to be protected under section 4b of the Act."" Nevertheless, the
extensive enforcement scheme of the CEA indicated that Congress had
not simply forgotten to mention an intended private right of action under
the Act and therefore, did not intend to create such a private remedy.1 55
The court considered the legislative history of the '74 Act supportive of
this conclusion. 5 ' In drafting the '74 Act, Congress considered several
bills containing proposed amendments to the Act. 15 7 Two Senate bills expressly provided a private right of action and recovery of treble damages
1I Id. at 54..
182 7 U.S.C. §

6b (1976). Section 4b of the CEA provides that contract market members
may not enter any transaction in commodity futures with any perssn to cheat or defraud
such person or willfully to deceive such person in regard to any act of agency performed. See
id.; notes 103 & 109 supra.
153 481 F. Supp. at 55-57. The Fischercourt applied the four part Cort analysis to discover whether Congress intended to create an implied private remedy under the CEA. See
id.; text accompanying notes 154-67 infra. The court, however, accorded greater weight to
analysis of the statutory language and legislative history of the Act than to analysis of the
other Cort tests. 481 F. Supp. at 155-57; see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
100 S. Ct. at 249; text accompanying note 126 supra.
I" See 481 F. Supp. at 56. For purposes of analysis, the Fischercourt assumed that the
first Cort factor favored implication of a private remedy under the CEA. Id. Courts generally agree that persons aggrieved by violations of anti-fraud provisions of the Act are members of the class for whose benefit the CEA was enacted. See National Super Spuds, Inc. v.
New York Mercantile Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Smith v.
Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 113 (N.D. IlM. 1979); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 312, 320-22 (S.D. Ohio 1979). But see Stone v. Saxon & Windsor
Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,000 at 23,885
(N.D. Ill.
Jan. 8, 1980) (option contract purchaser not member of class sought to be protected under §§ 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the Act). The courts base their conclusion on extensive
CEA protections against fraud and other deceptive trading practices. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§
6b (contracts designed to defraud prohibited), 13b (prohibition of market price manipulation) (1976); 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 6a (excessive speculation prohibited), 6o (prohibition of all
schemes to defraud) (West Supp. 1979). See generally 120 CONG. REc. 30466 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Dole); Hudson, supra note 103, at 8-12, 18-35.
1 See 481 F. Supp. at 56. Following Transamerica,the Fischer court considered the
second element of the Cort analysis, a determination of legislative intent, the most important in determining the existence of an implied private remedy under the CEA. See id. The
court determined legislative intent by analyzing the language and legislative history of the
Act. Id.; see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. at 249. See generally
text accompanying notes 108, 109 & 115-18 supra.
1" 481 F. Supp. at 56.
167See 481 F. Supp. at

56-57. See generally Hearings on S.2485, S.2578, S.2837 and
H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 737
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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for violations of the Act. 158 The House of Representatives bill, ultimately
adopted with modifications by both the House and Senate, provided only
for administrative reparation proceedings.159 The Fischer court concluded
that rejection of the Senate bills which contained an express private right
of action indicated congressional intent to deny an implied private
remedy. 160
Section 2 of the CEA establishes areas of exclusive Commission jurisdiction and provides that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction does not supersede or limit jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States or
any state. 6 " Plaintiff Fischer argued that the language of section 2 and its
legislative history evidenced congressional intent to save an implied private remedy.' The Fischer court, however, reasoned that section 2
merely affirmed the judiciary's role as one of appeal and final determina1"

See Hearings,supra note 157, at 77 (S. 2578 introduced by Sen. McGovern), 79 (S.

2837 introduced by Sen. Hart). Section 20(d)(3) of Senate Bill 2578 provided that any person violating any provision of the CEA would be liable to any person injured thereby for
treble the amount of damages sustained as a result of the violations. Id. at 77. Section
505(a) of Senate Bill 2837 provided that any person injured by a violation of the Act could
bring a civil action for restitution in any district court having jurisdiction of the party who
caused the injury. Id. at 79. In the event of willful violation of the Act, an aggrieved party
could recover treble damages. See id.
"' See 7 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West Supp. 1979); Hearings,supra note 157, at 125; text accompanying note 115 supra.
110 See 481 F. Supp. at 57. But see Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 113 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (failure of Congress to include express private remedy which provided for treble damage awards represents congressional intent not to expand recovery under implied private
action).
161 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979). Section 2 provides "[t]hat the Commission shall
have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements . . ., and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery" traded on contract markets (as
defined in 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1976)) and certain other exchanges. Id. Section 2 delineates the
jurisdiction of the SEC and other regulatory authorities. Id. The section then states that
"[n]othing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the
United States or any State." Id. Given the implication of a private right of action under the
CEA prior to the 1974 amendments, several courts have argued that § 2 expressly saves the
implied right. See text accompanying note 162 infra.
162 481 F. Supp. at 57; see R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fut. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,773 at 23,172 (N.D. IMI.1979); Smith v. Groover, 468
F. Supp. 105, 113-14 (N.D. III. 1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 459 F. Supp.
733, 737-38 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Gravois v. Fairchild, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,706 at 22,876 (E.D. La. 1978). In Groover, the court reasoned that since
Congress knew that a private right of action had been implied under the CEA and had been
warned during Senate committee hearings that provision for reparation proceedings might
be interpreted by courts as a denial of an implied private remedy, the Senate committee
drafting the '74 Act inserted the provision in § 2 granting federal court jurisdiction. 468 F.
Supp. at 114; see Hearings,supra note 157, at 205 (statement of Sen. Clark), 737 (statement
of Prof. Shotland); 119 CONG. Rc. 41333 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Poage). The court supported its conclusion by reference to remarks made during floor debates on an amendment
to the CEA which would speed disposition of reparations claims. 468 F. Supp. at 114; see
124 CONG. REC. S10537 (daily ed. July 12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston).
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tion after administrative reparation proceedings.' 63 The language and legislative history of section 2 were, at best, ambiguous on the meaning of
section 2.'1 The court considered review of the Act's legislative history
supportive of the conclusion that Congress had not intended to provide a
private remedy under the Act.'6 5
Applying the third Cort test, the Fischer court stated that a private
right of action should not be implied if unnecessary to fulfill the purpose
of the CEA.'66 In light of the extensive remedial and enforcement scheme
of the Act, implication of a private right of action was unnecessary, if not
superfluous, to the effectiveness of the Act.' 7 The Fischer court also observed that regulation of commodities trading is essentially a matter of
federal concern.'6 8 The fourth Cort test was, therefore, irrelevant to the
court's analysis of congressional intent.'6 9 The determination, based on
163 See 481 F. Supp. at 57. The Fischer court based its conclusion on the legislative
history of § 2 of the CEA. Id. The court cited remarks of Senator Talmadge in which he
concluded that the broad remedial provisions of the CEA were not intended to interfere
with jurisdiction of the courts in reparation proceedings. Id.; see 120 CONG. REC. 30459
(1974). The Fischer court regarded Senator Talmadge's remarks as evidence that Congress
intended § 2 merely to affirm the courts' jurisdiction in the reparations procedure. Id.; see 7
U.S.C.A. § 18(g) (West Supp. 1979).

1" 481 F. Supp. at 57.
165 Id.
166 Id.; see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977). The third element
of the Cort analysis considers whether implication of a private right of action is consistent
with the underlying purpose of the Act's legislative scheme. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78; see
text accompanying note 122 supra. According to Fischer,the question raised by the third
Cort factor is not whether implication of a private remedy would enhance regulatory effectiveness but whether such implication is necessary to the Act's legislative scheme of enforcement. 481 F. Supp. at 57; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). But
see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (whether implication of private remedy would enhance enforcement of statute); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105,
115 (N.D. M11.
1979) (implication compatible with CEA legislative scheme since implication
of private remedy adds additional deterrent to abusive trading practice).
167 481 F. Supp. at 57; see National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Contract markets, unlike brokers and floor
commission merchants, are not "registered persons" under the Act and, therefore, are exempt from liability to individuals pursuing their claims in reparation proceedings. Id.; see 7
U.S.C.A. § 18(a) (West Supp. 1979). The Commission alone has the power to assess monetary civil penalties against a contract market. 470 F. Supp. at 1261; see 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a
(West Supp. 1979). The Super Spuds court concluded that congressional exemption of contract markets from reparation liability is indicative of legislative intent to limit the exposure
of contract markets to liability, thereby preserving contract market viability. 470 F. Supp. at
1261. But see Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 117 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (no congressional
intent to insulate contract markets from private civil damage liability). Thus, implication of
a private remedy available against contract markets arguably would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the CEA's legislative scheme. See 470 F. Supp. at 1261.
168 470 F. Supp. at 57; see National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 115
(N.D. Ill. 1979).
16 470 F. Supp. at 57; see Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
311, 323 (S.D. Ohio 1979).

1008

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

the language and legislative history of the Act, that Congress did not intend to create an implied private right of action under the Act, supported
by the finding that implication of a private remedy was unnecessary to
fulfill the purpose of the Act, led the Fischer court to the conclusion that
no implied private action exists under section 4b of the CEA.
Unlike the Fischer court, the court in Alken v. Lerner170 recently concluded that an implied private right of action exists under section 4b of
the CEA.' 7 ' The difference in result is attributable, in part, to the court's
framing of the question presented for decision. Prior to the '74 Act,
courts generally recognized an implied private action under antifraud
provisions of the CEA. 7 2 The Alken court therefore sought to determine
not whether Congress intended to create an implied private remedy under

the CEA but whether Congress, through enactment of the '74 Act, intended to nullify prior court decisions which recognized an implied action
73
under the CEA.1
Applying the four part Cort analysis, 7 4 the Alken court first considered whether section 4b of the Act was enacted for the special benefit of
commodity market investors. 17 5 The language of section 4b expressly prohibits fraudulent trading practices by contract market members in their
dealing with investors. 71 The legislative history of section 4b indicates
that Congress enacted the section to protect commodities investors.'"
The Alken court concluded that analysis of the first Cort test favored
implication of a private action under section 4b for the benefit of such
investors.

78

According to the Alken court, the legislative history of the CEA evidences congressional intent to continue the implied private action recog170 No. 79-0023 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980). The plaintiff in Alken complained that defendants had fraudulently induced plaintiff's purchases of certain commodity futures contracts
in violation of section 4b of the CEA. See id., slip op. at 2, 3. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending, as a matter of law, that no implied private right of
action exists under section 4b of the Act. See id., slip op. at 1, 4. Applying the Cort analysis,
the Alken court determined that an implied private action exists under section 4b of the
CEA and denied defendants' motion for judgment. See id., slip op. at 5-9.
171 See Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 9 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980).
17, See id., slip op. at 3-4; note 14 supra.
1" See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 5.
174 See id. The Alken court recognized that the sole determinant of the existence of
implied actions under federal law is congressional intent to create or deny such actions. See
id.; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). Nevertheless, rather than
apply the modified Cort analysis employed by the Supreme Court majorities in Transamerica and Redington, the court applied the full four-part Cort analysis to determine congressional intent with respect to private actions under the CEA. See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 5-9;
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 251-55 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting). See generally text accompanying notes 120-26 supra.
175 See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 5; note 154 supra.
178See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976); note 152 supra.
177 See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 30466 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Dole); see generally Hudson, supra note 103, at 18-35.
178 See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 6.
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nized by the courts prior to the '74 Act."'s The Alken court conceded that
section 4b of the Act merely prohibits certain conduct and does not purport to create or deny any civil liability.'80 The legislative history of the
Act prior to '74 Act amendment is completely silent on the question
whether Congress intended private individual enforcement of section 4b
through an implied cause of action. 181 The court also acknowledged recent
Supreme Court warnings that courts must be reluctant to find implied
private actions in the absence of convincing evidence of congressional intent to create such actions.1 8 2 Nevertheless, the court was unwilling to

penalize private plaintiffs or fault Congress for the failure to foresee the
Supreme Court's recent change in attitude toward implication of private
actions. 1 s
During preparation of the '74 Act, Congress knew of the judicial implication of a private cause of action under section 4b of the CEA.1' 4 That
courts may have erred in the determination of the existence of such a
private action was immaterial to the Alken court's inquiry.18 5 The proper
inquiry was whether Congress, in enacting the '74 Act, believed that an
implied private action had become an integral part of the Act's enforcement scheme.1 8 Concluding that Congress was familiar with judicial implication of a private remedy under antifraud provisions of the Act, the
Alken court presumed that Congress expected the courts to interpret the
'74 Act as retaining the implied right.187 Only on a convincing showing
171 See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7. But see Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53,
57 (1979); text accompanying notes 154-65.
180 No. 79-0023, slip op. at 6. Compare Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
100 S. Ct. 242, 245 (1979) (statute in question prohibited fraudulent activity- prohibition
alone does not necessarily give rise to implied private action) with Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (statute in question created no prohibition on which
private remedy could be founded).
191 No. 79-0023, slip op. at 6; see note 134 supra.
12 Id.; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979); note 145 supra.
18

See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 6.

See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 6; Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 113-14 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 733, 737-38 (N.D. Cal. 1978); 119
CONG. REc. 41333 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Poage); Hearings, supra note 157, at 746 (statement of Prof. Shotland).
,85 No. 79-0023, slip. op. at 7.
186 Id.; see Brown v. General Serv's. Adm., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976) (dictum-relevant
inquiry not whether Congress correctly perceived state of law, but rather what Congress
perceived to be state of law).
187 See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7. The Alken court cited Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710-12 (1979), for the proposition that where federal law confers a special benefit on an identifiable class of plaintiffs, a court need not find congressional intent to
create a private remedy even though a finding that Congress explicitly sought to deny a
private remedy would be controlling. No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7 n.5. In Transamerica,however, the Supreme Court found that § 206 of the IAA was enacted for the special benefit of a
certain class of plaintiffs but denied the existence of an implied right of action. See 100 S.
Ct. at 245-46, 249. The TransamericaCourt, therefore, focused on the broad remedial and
enforcement provisions of the IAA and considered the enforcement scheme of the IAA indicative of legislative intent to deny a private action. Id. at 247.
1
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that Congress intended to deny a private remedy under the Act could the
defendants rebut the presumption of implication.'
The court considered unpersuasive the defendants' argument that
congressional consideration and rejection of legislation which expressly
provided a private cause of action under the CEA indicated congressional
intent to deny a private action. 189 Since the legislation also provided for
recovery of treble damages, the Alken court interpreted congressional rejection of the legislation as evidence of congressional reluctance to expand
recovery under the existing implied private action.'9 0 Additionally, the
court considered the '74 Act reparations proceeding an alternative to the
implied cause of action in federal court, not an exclusive private remedy.' 9' The '78 Act provision for a state right of action merely evidenced
congressional intent to supplement the implied private action."9 2 The Alken court therefore concluded that Congress had not clearly expressed an
intent to nullify federal court decisions which had recognized an implied
3
remedy under the Act prior to the '74 Act and '78 Act amendments. 19
Analyzing the third Cort factor, the Alken court considered whether
implication of a private remedy was consistent with the underlying purpose of the CEA.'" Rather than ask whether implication was necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the Act, the Alken court questioned whether
implication would be helpful in accomplishing the Act's purpose. 95 The
court concluded that implication of a private action would bolster enforcement of the Act's provisions, further deter abusive commodities
trading practices, and speed review of investor damage claims.9 8
Since regulation of commodities markets is a federal concern, the
fourth Cort test also favored implication of a private right of action.'9
The Alken court's application of the Cort analysis thus failed to indicate
congressional intent to deny an implied private remedy. 98 Therefore, the
'" No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7.
189 Id. But see Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (1979); text accompanying notes 154-65 supra.
190 No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7; see text accompanying note 160 supra.
191 See No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7-8. See also R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co.,
466 F. Supp. 345, 347 (N.D. l. 979); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 114 (N.D. 111.
1979). But see Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56 (1979); National Super
Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (1979).
"' No. 79-0023, slip op. at 8; see note 118 supra.
193 No. 79-0023, slip op. at 8.

I" No. 79-0023, slip op. at 8-9; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); text accompanying note 122 supra.
195 No. 79-0023, slip op. at 8; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703
(1979). But see Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 57 (1979) (third Cort test
framed in terms of necessity of implying private remedy); note 167 supra. In both Transamerica and Redington, the Supreme Court refused to consider the third Cort test in analyzing legislative intent. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242,
249 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); note 135 supra.
I" No. 79-0023, slip op. at 8-9.
1
Id. at 9; see text accompanying notes 168 & 169 supra.
No. 79-0023, slip op. at 9.
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court recognized an implied private cause of action under section 4b of

the Act.
In Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd.,199 plaintiff Stone complained that the defendants had entered into commodity option contracts
with the plaintiff for the sale of gold, silver bullion or kruggerands in
violation of sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the CEA.2 0 0 The defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that private plaintiffs have no
standing to sue for violations of the Act.20 1 In a narrowly drawn opinion,
the Stone court determined that no implied private action exists under

sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the2 0 Act
and dismissed the complaint for lack
2

of subject matter jurisdiction.
Prior to the Redington and Transamerica decisions, Seventh Circuit
courts consistently implied private actions under antifraud provisions of
the Act.20 3 The Stone case, however, involved private enforcement of a
CEA ban on options trading, not private enforcement of antifraud provisions. 204 Thus, the Stone court did not consider pre-TransamericaSeventh Circuit precedent controlling. 205 Before addressing whether an implied private remedy exists under sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the CEA,
the court reviewed recent Supreme Court modifications of the Cort analysis. 20 8 Analyzing the Transamericadecision, the court employed a three
.. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,000 (N.D. IMI.Jan. 8,
1980).
200 Id. at 23,879-80. A purchaser of a commodity option contract obtains the right to
buy or sell a commodity at an agreed price within a specific time. See 1978 Senate Report,
supra note 8, at 132, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2169 (option defined). Sections
4c(b) and 4c(c) of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 6c(b), 6c(c) (West Supp. 1979). prohibit transactions in certain commodity futures option codtracts. See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,881.
201 See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,880.
201 See id. But see Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346, 354 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (implied
private remedy under § 4c(b) of the Act).
203 See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 103 n.8 (7th Cir. 1977); Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); R.J. Hereley & Son v. Stotler
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 345, 348 (N.D. IL. 1979); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 115 (N.D.
1967).
Ill.
1979); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. Ill.
20 See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,882.
205 Id. at 23,882-83. The Stone court cited Redington for the proposition that a private
right of action must be found, if at all, in substantive provisions of the CEA sought to be
enforced, not by reference to other provisions of the Act. Id.; see Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979). In Redington, the Supreme Court denied an implied
private right of action under § 17(a) of the '34 Act even though such an action had previously been found under §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the '34 Act. See id.
2 See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,883-85. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized an implied
private remedy under Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination in education, 20 U.S.C. §
1681 (1976). 441 U.S. at 717. Analyzing the first Cort test, the Cannon Court found that the
language of the statute expressly identified the class which Congress intended to benefit.
See id. at 693-94. Where federal law expressly confers rights on a certain class of persons,
the silence or ambiguity of legislative history would not preclude finding an implied cause of
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factor analysis to determine the existence of an implied private remedy
under sections 4c(b) and 4c(c).20° First, the court analyzed the statutory
scheme of enforcement of the Act.2 0 8 Second, the court reviewed the lan-

guage of sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) to determine whether plaintiff Stone was
a member of the class sought to be protected. 20 9 Third, the court examined the legislative history of the Act to determine whether the legislative history supports the proposition that Congress intended to create a
private right of action under sections 4c(b) and 4c(c).21 0 Only if this three
part analysis did not preclude the existence of an implied action, would
the Stone court proceed
to analysis of the third and fourth elements of
211
the Cort analysis.

21 2
The Stone court reviewed the elaborate CEA enforcement scheme
and noted that the Act specifies circumstances in which enforcement of
CEA provisions may be obtained in federal court.213 Additionally, the Act
identifies the parties who may bring such proceedings. 214 Individuals aggrieved by violations of the Act may bring an action in federal court only
for enforcement and review of reparations orders.2 15 In Transamerica,the
Supreme Court stated that where a statute expressly provides remedies,

action to enforce such rights. See id. at 694-703. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560 (1979), the Supreme Court refused to find an implied private action under § 17(a)
of the '34 Act. Id. at 579. Section 17(a) did not expressly confer rights on any particular
class of individuals and the legislative history of the '34 Act was entirely silent on the implication question. Id. at 569-71. Given the Cannon and Redington decisions alone, the Stone
court would have concluded that the first Cort test was the most important in determining
the existence of implied private actions under federal law. See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,883.

[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,884-85. The Stone
court interpreted Transamericaas deemphsizing the first element of the Cort analysis. Id.
at 23,884. Even though the plaintiff in Transamericawas a member of the class sought to be
protected under § 206 of the IAA, the Supreme Court concluded that implication of a private remedy was not Congress' intended method of protecting such plaintiffs. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246 (1979); text accompanying
notes 142 & 143 supra.
"" [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885; see Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 247 (1979); text accompanying notes 144 &
145 supra.
1" [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885; see Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246 (1979); text accompanying note 142
supra.
110 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885; see Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246-49 (1979); text accompanying note 142
supra.
.. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885; see Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 249 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1979).
...[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885; see text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
113 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. RFP. (CCH) at 23,885.
14

Id.

M15
See id.; 7 U.S.C. § 18(f), (g) (1976); note 115 supra.
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courts must be reluctant to find implied remedies.2"" The Stone court
concluded that the detailed enforcement scheme of the Act evidenced
careful congressional consideration of enforcement and, thus, indicated
that Congress
did not intend to create an implied private action under
2 17
the CEA.
The court carefully limited analysis of the first Cort test. Conceding
that Congress might have enacted certain provisions of the Act for the
special benefit of commodities investors, the court focused on whether
sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) were enacted for the special benefit of such investors.2 1 8 The court found that the statutory language and legislative his-

tory of sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) suggested congressional intent to protect
the general public, not just investors, from options trading abuses. 1 9
Since the statute did not single out commodity market investors for special protection, the court concluded that plaintiff Stone was not intended
to be a special beneficiary of CEA sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) 2 20
Where federal law includes an elaborate scheme of enforcement and
fails to designate a particular protected class of plaintiffs, the legislative
history of the federal law must clearly indicate congressional intent to
provide a private right of action before a court may properly recognize
such an action.22 1 The legislative history of the CEA provides no evidence
of legislative intent to create an implied private action under sections
4c(b) and 4c(c) of the Act.2 22 The Stone court observed that Congress

considered and rejected proposed amendments to the CEA which would
216 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 247 (1979); see
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885.
S17[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885; see Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 247 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
111 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885; see note 176
supra.
219[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885-86. Sections 4c(b)
and 4c(c) of the Act prohibit options trading in certain commodities. Id. at 23,885; see 7
U.S.C.A. § 6c(b), (c) (West Supp. 1979). The language of these sections does not suggest
special protection for commodity market investors. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Com. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) at 23,885. According to the Stone court, sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) suggest a
purpose of protecting the general public from options trading abuses and offer no greater
protection to any identifiable class or subset of the general public. Id. at 23,885-86. The
legislative history of the '78 Act also suggests that sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) were enacted for
the protection of the general public. See 1978 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 2, [1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2102. Although the legislative history of the '78 Act indicates
that § 4c(b) and § 4c(c) were enacted to protect the general public, only those members of
the public who invest in options subject to the '78 Act ban will ever benefit from the protections of § 4c(b) and § 4c(c). See id. The Stone court nevertheless concluded that Congress
did not intend investors to be special beneficiaries of § 4c(b) and § 4c(c) protections. [19771980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,886.
220 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,886.
2 See id.
"2 Id.; see text accompanying notes 155-63 supra.
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have established an express private right of action.228 Although Congress
recognized the existence of a large backlog of reparations cases pending
before the Commission during congressional preparation of the '78 Act,
Congress failed to alleviate the backlog problem by creating a private
cause of action in federal court.22 4 The court attributed little relevance to
the fact that courts had found an implied private action under the CEA
prior to enactment of the '74 Act.225 Even if courts had universally accepted a private right of action prior to the '74 Act, the Stone court
would not necessarily have concluded, in light of contrary statutory language, that Congress intended to perpetuate a private action by enacting
the '74 Act and '78 Act.2 6 The legislative history of the Act therefore
failed to provide persuasive evidence of congressional intent to provide an
implied private remedy under the Act. 227 Since the Stone court's three

part analysis of legislative intent did not support implication of a private
action, the court considered analysis of the third and fourth Cort factors
unnecessary and refused to recognize8 an implied private remedy under
22
sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the Act.

As the Fischer,Alken and Stone decisions indicate, courts disagree on
the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court's implication analysis afM See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,886; text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
...[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,886; see 124 CONG.
Rc. S10537 (daily ed. July 12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston-backlog of reparations
proceedings attributable to unfortunate position taken by some courts that no implied private remedy exists under CEA).
'" See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,886-87; note 113
supra.
118 See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,887. The Stone
court cited SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), for the proposition that congressional reenactment of a statute need not necessarily indicate congressional approval of judicial interpretation of the statute, especially where the language plainly indicates the contrary. [19771980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. RzP. (CCH) at 23,887; see 436 U.S. at 121.
See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,887. The Stone
court considered unpersuasive the argument that section 2 of the CEA expressly saves an
implied private right of action under the Act. See id.; text accompanying notes 161-165
supra. The fact that the Commission has consistently interpreted the Act as allowing an
implied private action also had no effect on the Stone court's conclusion. See [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,887. See also Smith v. Groover, 468 F.
Supp. 105, 115 (N.D. IMI.
1979). Several courts have concluded that the Commission's opinion is to be given considerable deference in determining whether an implied remedy exists
under the CEA. See, e.g., id.; Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 733, 738
(N.D. Cal. 1978). Other courts, however, have determined that the Commission's interpretation confficts with the intent of Congress. See, e.g., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York
Mercantile Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Alkan v. Rosenthal & Co.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FPur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,797, 23,252 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
While Commission views are important in areas of the Commission's particular expertise,
interpretation of the CEA and determination of legislative intent are the province of the
judiciary. See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,887; 470 F.
Supp. at 1262; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,252.
118 See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,887-88.
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ter Redington and Transamerica.Although the courts agree that legislative intent is determinative of the existence of implied causes of action
under federal law, courts are unable to agree on the elements of the legislative intent determination.2 2 9 One element of the intent determination is
whether plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the CEA was
enacted.2 30 Commodities investors are members of the class for whose
special benefit the antifraud and options trading ban provisions of the
CEA were enacted.23 1 After Transamerica, however, courts should 2not
of legislative intent.23

consider the special benefit analysis conclusive
Analysis of the language of the CEA is also an element of the legislative intent determination.233 While prohibiting certain conduct, neither
the antifraud nor options trading ban provisions of the Act expressly create or deny civil liability.23 4 In addition, Congress has established a com-

prehensive remedial and enforcement scheme for the Act.23 5 Since Congress easily could have created an express private cause of action under
the CEA238 and, in fact, considered legislation which would have provided
such a cause of action, 237 the language of the Act indicates that Congress
did not intend to create a private remedy under the Act.
Looking to the legislative history of the CEA, the Alken court noted
that Congress knew of judicial implication of a private action under the
CEA while considering enactment of the '74 Act.23 The court concluded
"' See Alken v. Lerner; No. 79-0023, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980) (applying fourpart Cort analysis to determine legislative intent); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd.,

[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. RFP. (CCH) 1 21,000, at 23,885 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8,
1980) (Cort test modified in light of Transamerica); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F.
Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (applying four-part Cort analysis).

21oSee Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246 (1979);

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979); text accompanying notes 132,

141 & 142 supra.
33

See Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980); Fischer v.

Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D. Tex. 1979); note 219 supra. But see Stone v.
Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)

21,000, at 23,885-86 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1980) (investors not part of class sought specifically to
be protected under §§ 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the Act).
,3,See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246 (1979) (§ 206
of IAA intended to benefit clients of investment advisors but Congress did not intend § 206
to be enforced through private right of action).
233

See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 246-47 (1979);

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1979); text accompanying notes 133

& 140-47 supra.
34 See Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 6 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980) (antifraud
provisions of Act); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,000, at 23,885-86 (options trading ban provisions of Act).
235 See Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.

FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,000, at 23,885 (N.D. III. Jan. 8, 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co.,
481 F. Supp. 53, 56 (1979); text accompanying notes 115-18 supra.

238 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 248 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979).
237 See text accompanying notes 157-60, 189 & 190 supra.
23 Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 6 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980); see text accompa-
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that Congress preferred to rely on judicial implication of a private action
under the Act rather than include an express private remedy within the
Act's provisions.23 9 When considering enactment of the '78 Act, Congress
also knew that some courts had denied an implied private remedy under
the CEA.24 0 Following the logic of the Alken court, if Congress considered
judicial denial of an implied remedy under the Act erroneous, Congress
would have provided an express private remedy within the provisions of
the '78 Act. Therefore, the legislative history of the Act, otherwise silent
on the implication question, is ambiguous on the question of congressional intent to create or deny an implied private remedy under the Act.
On essentially the same analytical foundation, the Supreme Court in
Transamericafound no legislative intent to create a private action under
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. 241 Since determination of legislative intent was dispositive of the implication question, the Transamerica Court considered analysis of the third and fourth Cort tests unnecessary. 242 Application of the Transamerica implication analysis
therefore points to the conclusion that no implied private right of action
exists under the CEA. Of course, Congress may legislate such a private
action.24s Absent such legislation, however, courts must be wary of grant24
ing private plaintiffs standing to sue under the CEA. 4
C. Proving Fraud Under the Commodities Acts
The basic antifraud provisions of the commodities acts are sections
4b 24 5 and 4c 2" of the Commodity Exchange Act and section 4o of the '74
Act. 24 7 Under section 4b, persons generally connected with making futures contracts may not cheat, defraud, or willfully deceive others. 248 Section 4b requires the plaintiff to prove that the alleged violator acted willfully or knowingly. 49 Section 4c specifically prohibits wash sales, cross
nying note 184 supra.
" Alken v. Lerner, No. 79-0023, slip op. at 7 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1980); see text accompanying notes 185-87 supra.
,140See 124 CONG. RIc. S10537 (daily ed. July 12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston-criticizing court opinions holding that reparations proceeding is exclusive remedy).
141 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 245-49 (1979);
text accompanying notes 138-48 supra.
141

See 100 S. Ct. at 249.

I'l See note 236 supra.
244 100 S. Ct. at 247.
145 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
248 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1976).
147 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1976).
248 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) & (C) (1976). Section 4b(B) provides that persons generally connected with making futures contracts shall not willfully make false reports. Id. § 6b(B).
Section 4b(D) prohibits a broker from taking a market position opposite to that of his customer, offsetting orders or willingly and knowingly buying and selling orders without the
customer's consent. Id. § 6b(D). See generally Commodity FuturesAntifraud, supra note 6,
at 903.
19 See CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979); Master Commodities, Inc. v.
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trades, accommodation trades of fictitious sales. 250 Somewhat broader

than sections 4b and 4c, section 4o of the '74 Act generally prohibits commodity trading advisors or pool operators from defrauding any client or
prospective client.2 51 Section 4o is similar to both section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934252 ('34 Act) and section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.253 By tracking specific federal securities stat-

utes, Congress invited judicial application of the case law under federal
securities acts to transactions under the commodities acts.
Two Supreme Court cases under the federal securities laws provide
guidance in interpreting whether the sections require a plaintiff to prove
scienter. Although section 4o is similar to sections 10(b) and 206, the Supreme Court has held that proof of a violation of section 10(b) requires a
different standard than proving a violation of section 206.-Section 10(b)
provides that no person shall use or employ any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.25 ' Interpreting the statutory language of section 10(b), the Supreme Court in
Texas Cattle Mgmt. Co., 586 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1978) (private civil suit); Hatmier v.
CFTC, 554 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1977) (evil motive not necessary); Silverman v. CFTC, 549

F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1977) (unauthorized trading for customer's account).
' 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (1976); see S. REP. No. 850, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-39, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 2087 (glossary of terms). Section 6c(a)(B) & 6c(b)-(d)
apply to transactions in commodity options. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 6c(a) (B) & 6c(b)-(d) (West
Supp. 1979); see, e.g., CFTC v. U.S. Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1152-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
251 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1976). Section 4o provides that any commodity trading advisor or
pool operator, directly or indirectly, shall not "employ any device, scheme or, artifice to
defruad" any client or prospective client or "engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business" which defrauds or deceives any client or prospective client. Id. Under the '74 Act
a commodity trading advisor includes any person who engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications, as to the value of commodities or trading in
commodity futures. -7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979). The term excludes persons whose
services are solely incidental to their business. Id. A commodity pool operator includes anyone who solicits funds or property from others for an investment trust or syndicate for the
purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979).
A commodity pool, like a mutual fund, requires investors to contribute to a common fund in
which an account executive trades. Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] CoM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,706 at 22,870 (E.D. La. 1978).
252 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) provides that no person shall employ any manipulative or deceptive
device in contravention of SEC rules and regulations. Id. Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder generally makes it unlawful for any person to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud or to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10b-5 (1979); cf. 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1976) (unlawful for commodity
trading advisor to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any client). See generally Note, Rule 10b-5: The Circuits Debate the Exclusivity of Remedies, the PurchaserSeller Requirement, and Constructive Deception, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 877 (1980).
'S See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976); text accompanying note 118 infra. Section 4o(1) of the
'74 Act tracks the language of 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1)-(2). See also 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1) (1976).
2" See note 108 supra.
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Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder25 5 dismissed a private complaint alleging
only negligence by an accounting firm.25 ' The Hochfelder Court held that
a private plaintiff must allege scienter in bringing an action under section
10(b).2 57 The Supreme Court reasoned that the language in section 10(b),
containing words such as "manipulative" or "deceptive," connotes a requirement of knowing or intentional misconduct.25s The Hochfelder
Court did not decide the question of whether the
SEC need prove scien259
ter in an injunctive action under section 10(b).
The Supreme Court has decided, however, in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc.260 that the SEC does not have to show scienter in
an injunctive suit under section 206.211 Section 206 provides that an investment adviser shall not employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or engage in a transaction which operates as a fraud or
deceit upon a client.2 2 Section 206 applies only to investment advisors, 263
while 10(b) applies to any person.2 6" The Capital Gains Court held that
an investment adviser's failure to disclose material facts constituted fraud
under section 206.265 The CapitalGains Court reasoned that the intent of
425 U.S. 185 (1976).

" Id. at 215. In Hochfelder, the defendant Ernst & Ernst audited the books of a Chicago securities company. The securities company's president fraudulently induced customers to invest funds in a certain account which the president promised would return a high
rate of return. The securities company's books never reflected the account. Id. at 188-89. A
defrauded customer instituted suit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against Ernst &
Ernst. The plaintiff alleged that the accounting firm was negligent in not discovering the
failure to include an accounting of the fraudulent transactions. Id. at 189-201. Without remanding the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's action since the plaintiff disclaimed any fraudulent or intentional conduct by Ernst & Ernst. Id. at 215. See generally
Johnson, Applying Hochfelder In Commodity Fraud Cases, 20 B.C. L. Rav. 633, 633-36
[hereinafter cited as Johnson].
425 U.S. at 193. The Hochfelder court used the term "scienter" to refer to a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Id. at n.12. The court noted that
requisite scienter is something less than specific intent, yet more than simple negligence. Id.
at 193 n.12; see 1978-1979 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 36 WASH. & LaE L.
REv. 845, 923 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979 Developments]; Note, Rule 10b-5 Liability After Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHi. L.
REv. 218, 231 (1978). See generally W. PROSSR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at
669-700 (4th ed. 1971) (scienter includes three states of mind: (1) knowing; (2) without belief in the truth; (3) reckless); 1978-1979 Developments at 924 nn.169-70 (scienter includes
misrepresentation or omission).
2" 425 U.S. at 197.
159 Id. at 193 n.12 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) for
comparison).
25

80 375 U.S. 180 (1963).

161

Id. at 181-82.

26 15
23 Id.

U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).

See note 108 supra.
285375 U.S. at 200. The SEC may compel a registered investment advisor to disclose his
practice of purchasing shares of a security for his own account shortly before recommending
that security to customers for long-term investment. Id. at 181-82. The fact that Congress
added the word "manipulative" to the Investment Advisers Act by a 1960 amendment, 15
1"
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Congress in enacting the remedial Investment Advisers Act was to allow
the courts flexibility in avoiding frauds. 28 8 The Court noted that a requirement that the SEC must show deliberate dishonesty would result in
nullifying the protective purpose of the statute.8 7 The Hochfelder and
Capital Gains decisions thus demonstrate that relevant considerations in
determining whether an antifraud statute requires scienter include the
statute's language and purpose and the identify of the complainant.
In CFTC v. Savage,268 a case of first impression under section 4o, the
Ninth Circuit applied Hochfelder and Capital Gains Bureau to determine whether the Commission must prove scienter in an injunctive action. The Commission alleged that Savage2 69 offset transactions that customers of American International Trading Company (AITC)270 made by
being the buyer of AITC customer sell orders and the seller of AITC customer buy orders.27 1 The alleged purpose of the offsetting transactions
was to enable AITC to circumvent the Commission's segregation requirements.2 7 2 The Commission complained that Savage violated sections
4b 2 7 4c,171 and 40. ' 75 In a motion for summary judgment, the CommisU.S.C. § 80b-6(4), does not justify a narrow interpretation of the original enactment. Id. at
199. The word "manipulative" is no broader than deceptive or fraudulent where the plaintiff
charges the advisor with failure to disclose information. Id. Thus, the Capital Gains court
did not rely on the 1960 amendment in holding that section 206 does not require proof of
scienter.
:" 375 U.S. at 195.
287 Id. at 200. In Capital Gains, the Supreme Court distinguished a private damage
action from an injunctive action. Id. at 193. The Supreme Court noted that fraud has a
broader meaning in equity than at common law and that the intention to defraud or misrepresent is not a necessary element of fraud in an equitable suit. Id.
28 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979).
201 Savage was a member of a Commission-registered contract market. Id. at 274.
.0 The American International Trading Company (AITC) was a registered futures
commission merchant. 611 F.2d at 280; see 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1979). AITC managed approximately 900 customers in a managed account program. 611 F.2d at 280.
!71 611 F.2d at 275. Savage sustained losses with respect to customers who had deficits
in their accounts and enjoyed profits on transactions with customers who had credit balances in their accounts. Id.
272 Id. The Commodity Exchange Act requires futures commission merchants to maintain net capital equal to a certain percentage of aggregate indebtedness. 7 U.S.C. § 6f (1976);
17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1979). The percentage requirement is less if the merchant segregates the
customers' funds. The '74 Act extended the definition of "commodity" to include all transactions in commodities for future delivery, including transactions in previously unregulated
commodities. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.The '74 Act thus extended the segregation requirements to transaction regarding the previously unregulated commodities. Cf. 17,
C.F.R. § 32.6 (1979) (segregation requirements regarding options). As a result, AITC needed
an additional $10,000 to comply with the '74 Act. 611 F.2d at 275 n.5. AITC sought to
reduce its requirements by reducing the amounts AITC owed the customers under the existing accounts. Id. Rather than raise additional capital, AITC allegedly effected transfers
through Savage between customers' accounts having losses and gains. Id. The result was to
reduce customers' aggregate account balances. Id.
171 See text accompanying notes 218 & 219 supra.
'7' See text accompanying note 250 supra.
27 See text accompanying notes 251-53 supra. The Commission complained that Say-
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sion requested the court to enjoin Savage from violating the antifraud
sections. 27 6 The district court enjoined Savage from violating sections 4b
2
and 40. "'

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
against Savage for violating section 40.7 s The Savage court held that, in
age acted as a commodity trading advisor without registering with the Commission. 611 F.2d
at 274-75; see note 107 supra. Savage traded on the floor for his own account, but had not
registered with the Commission. 611 F.2d at 274. The Commission alleged that Savage indirectly communicated information to discretionary account customers. Id. at 280; see note 13
supra. Savage communicated trading advice to the AITC employee responsible for making
trading decisions for the managed account programs. 611 F.2d at 280. Savage did not directly communicate with the AITC customers, although Savage knew AITC acted upon his
advice. Id. at 280-81. Savage claimed that he was exempt from registration because he did
not hold himself out as a commodity trading advisor and had not furnished commodity
trading advice for more than fifteen persons. Id. at 274; see 7 U.S.C. § 6m (1976). The
Commission had denied Savage registration because Savage's previous felony conviction
rendered him unfit to be a commodity trading advisor. See Savage v. CFTC, 548 F.2d 192,
197 (7th Cir. 1977); 7 U.S.C. § 8a(2)(B) (1976). The district court enjoined Savage from
acting as a commodity trading advisor without registering. 611 F.2d at 280. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision and held that Savage knew that more than fifteen persons would
rely on his advice. Id. The Savage court reasoned that an advisor may furnish information
indirectly as well as directly. Id.; see CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 75-11, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) $ 20,098 at 20,763 n.6 (1975) (registration of general
partners of commodity pool as operators and trading advisors). See also CFTC Interpretive
Letter No. 76-9 [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,151 (1976)
(issue of paying or nonpaying clients relevant only to determination of whether person is
advisor-not whether he is entitled to exemption). Further, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
courts should liberally construe remedial statutes. 611 F.2d at 280; cf. SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (public policy strongly supports SEC registration). Failure to require advisors to register permits advisors to circumvent procedural safeguards by
relaying unqualified advice through an intermediary. 611 F.2d at 280. The Savage court
noted that Savage provided advice to AITC and knew that AITC would incorporate that
advice into transactions on behalf of AITC's customers. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
congressional intent of the registration requirement was to protect ultimate customers from
the potential risks of unqualified investors. Id.; see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 6k (registration as
associated with futures commission merchant) & 6n(1)(A)&(B) (reporting requirements of
commodity trading pool) (1976).
116 611 F.2d at 274-75. In Savage, the Commission initially sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against Savage, AITC, and twelve other individual defendants who were
employees of AITC and the Mid-America Commodity Exchange (MACE). Id. All of the
defendants except Savage and two other individuals accepted consent decrees. Id.
177 611 F.2d at 276-77. The district court issued a preliminary injunction restraining
Savage from making false reports, offsetting trades with a customer, and engaging in "wash"
or accommodation trades in violation of sections 4b and 4o. The Commission filed a motion
for summary judgment. 611 F.2d at 277. Savage denied arrangements with two defendants,
denied "knowingly" entering into trades with AITC customers "away from market price,"
and denied entering into trades with the intention of transferring balances between AITC
customers. Id. Based on the Commission's motion and affidavits, the district court entered
an order and judgment of permanent injunction against Savage and the two remaining defendants. Savage appealed from that order. Id.
278 611 F.2d at 285-86. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding of
jurisdiction and venue based on telephone calls to the central district of California since the
telephone calls Savage placed from Chicago to the central district of California were an

1980]

1021

COMMODITIES LAW

a Commission injunctive action, section 4o requires only that the violator
act intentionally."" The court reasoned that a commodity trading advisor's intention to undertake the act which defrauds a client or prospective
client violates section 40.280 The Commission need only prove that the
advisor intended the act, not that the advisor intended to defraud or to
deceive. 28 1 Since section 4o resembles several antifraud sections of the
federal securities laws,28 2 the Savage court analogized to the securities
laws to hold that section 4o does not require scienter. 283 The Ninth Cir-

cuit distinguished the holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder28 that scienter was required in a private damage action under section 10(b).28 5 The
Savage court noted that, while section 10(b) has language similar to section 4o,288 section 4o broadly prohibits any transaction, practice or course
of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or pro87
Section 10(b) does not contain a counterpart to this
spective client.
2
provision. 8 Section 4o is more like section 206 of the Investment Advis-

ers Act of 1940.29 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since the Supreme
Court held in Capital Gains"90 that the SEC does not have to show scienter in an injunctive suit under section 206,291 the Commission does not

have to show scientr in an injunctive suit under section

9

40.2 2

Further,

the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Commission's action against Savage

Gains while Hochfelder inwas an injunctive action like that in 2Capital
93
volved an action for private damages.
Although affirming the summary judgment against Savage for violatintegral part of a scheme centered upon AITC customers in California. Id. at 277-79; see 7
U.S.C.A. § 13a-1 (West Supp. 1979).
270 611 F.2d at 285.
80 Id.
281 Id. The Ninth Circuit found that Savage knew that AITC would use his advice when
AITC traded for its customers. Id. at 286.
:82 See text accompanying notes 252 & 253 supra.
18
611 F.2d at 285-86.
:5 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
18 See text accompanying notes 254-59 supra.
21 See text accompanying notes 252 & 254 supra.
187 611 F.2d at 285; see note 252 supra.
1" 611 F.2d at 285. The Savage court observed that, unlike section 10(b), the language
of Rule 10b-5 is almost identical to section 4o(1) under the '74 Act. Id.; see note 252 supra.
The Savage court noted that the Hochfelder court read Rule 10b-5 as arguably proscribing
conduct regardless of scienter. 611 F.2d at 285 n.15; see note 252 supra. Moreover, several
courts have held that the SEC need not show scienter in enforcement actions under Rule
10b-5. 611 F.2d at 285; see, e.g., SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 619, 624 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 227 (1979); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir.
1976). But see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1978) (knowing conduct satisfied scienter standard in SEC suit). See generally 1978-1979 Developments, supra note 257,
at 932-37.
18 See text accompanying notes 253, 262-64 supra.
18o 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
," See text accompanying notes 260-63 supra.
:92 611 F.2d at 285.
193 Id.
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ing section 4o, the Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment was improper against Savage for alleged violations of sections 4b and 4c. 2" The
Savage Court reasoned that sections 4b and 4c require that the violator
act with scienter.2 " The Commission must show that Savage knew he was
cheating,2 " or knew his report was false, 297 or knew that he was deceiv299
ing, 29" or knew that he was taking the opposite side of a transaction.

The Commission may prove scienter and violation of section 4b if the
violator acted in reckless disregard of the consequences of his acts. 00 In
order to show a section 4c violation, the Commission must prove that
Savage had knowledge of his involvement in an accommodation sale or a
fictitious transaction.30 1 Savage's denial or knowledge of violations of sections 4b and 4c raised
a genuine issue of material fact and made summary
302
judgment improper.
The various applications of the antifraud provisions in Savage illustrate the differences between section 4b and section 4o. The Ninth Circuit properly held that a defendant has not violated section 4b unless he
acts with scienter80 3 Each subsection of section 4b requires intentional
conduct.'" Section 4b uses words, such as "cheat," "defraud," and "willfully, 305 which connote deliberate acts.30 8 While Congress has not
Id. at 283-84.
25 Id.
' 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1976).
:94

:9
9S

2-9

7 U.S.C. § 6b(B) (1976).
7 U.S.C. § 6b(C) (1976).
7 U.S.C. § 6b(D) (1976).

:00 611 F.2d at 283; see note 257 supra.
01Id. at 284. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Savage from SEC v. Aaron, 605.2d 612
(2d Cir. 1979). Aaron involved a securities fruad action in which the Second Circuit noted
that the requirements of scienter in government enforcement suits differ from private damages actions. Id. at 621. The Savage court thus held that the explicit provisions of section 4b
must be given more weight than the court's desire to encourage Commission enforcement
actions. Id. at 284 n.14. But see CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp.
1149, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
302 611 F.2d at 284. The Commission has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact. See FED. R. Cv. P. 56.
:03 See note 256 supra.
0o4611 F.2d at 641-43. Section 4b deals only with fraud between a principal (customer)
and an agent (e.g., salesman; floor broker). Id. at 636 n.22.
301 The Commission deleted the word "willfully," as used in section 4b, in promulgating
Regulation 30.02. See 17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1979) (fraud in transactions on non-domestic contract markets). Otherwise, the regulation follows section 4b's language. One district court
has held that Regulation 30.02 is void to the extent that it exceeds the scope of section 4b.
Palmer Trading Company, Inc. v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Furr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,900 (N.D. M11.
1979) (private right of action).
306 CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d at 283; accord, McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F.
Supp. 573, 576 (E.D. La. 1972), affl'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); see Silverman v. CFTC,
549 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1977) (willful violation of § 4b where account executive intentionally transcted business not authorized by customer); Goodman v. Benson, 286 F.2d 896, 900
(7th Cir. 1961) (Goodman had ample reason to know limit of investment in rye futures).
Evil motive is not a necessary element of § 4b fraud. Haltmier v. CFTC, 554 F.2d 556, 562
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changed the restrictive language in section 4b since the original statute in
1936,307 Congress has added section 4o in 1974.308 Section 4o's broad language proscribing an advisor's act which defrauds a client justifies the
Ninth Circuit's holding that the Commission does not have to show scienter to prove a violation.30 9 Section 4o(1)(A) alone does not justify a finding that a plaintiff does not have to show scienter, particularly in light of
Hochfelder's interpretation of similar words in the '34 Act.310 The language in section 4o(1)(B), however, is broader than the language in section 10(b).3 11 Nothing in section 4o(1)(B) suggests a requirement of scienter.3 12 Section 4o(1)(B) prohibits a commodity trading advisor from
engaging in any transaction or practice which operates as afraud or deceit on any client.3 1 3 The Commission may prove a section 4o(1)(B) violation by showing that the advisor intended to do the act and that the act
314
results in a fraud on the client.
Moreover, the purpose and scope of section 4o supports the Savage
holding that the Commission need not prove that the defendant had
knowledge that his action would defraud the client. 1 5 Congress confined
section 4o, like section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, to investment
advisors, whereas Congress applied section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to any
person.316 Sections 4o and 206 hold persons whom the general public en3 17
trusts with investment matters to higher standards than section 10(b).
Section 4o, like the Investment Advisers Act and unlike section 10(b),
implements the fiduciary obligations that characterize an advisor's relationship to his client.3 1 8 Proof of actual knowledge of the consequences of
31 9
one's act is less necessary with investment advisors than with others.
(2d Cir. 1977). The plaintiff can prove the defendant's knowledge by demonstrating that the
defendant knew that the acts were unauthorized. 549 F.2d at 31 (violation of § 4b where
defendant engaged in unauthorized transactions in customer's account in hope of profit and
subsequent approval by client).
30 Pus. L. No. 675, 79 Stat. 1943 (1936); see Johnson, supra note 256, at 643.
"8 See text accompanying notes 251-53 supra.
309 See text accompanying notes 278-93 supra.
30 See text accompanying notes 254-59 supra.
311 611 F.2d at 285. Section 4o(1)(A), like section 10(b), makes it unlawful "to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client." 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1) (1976). Section
4o(1)(A) seems superfluous. Section 4o(1)(B) should cover any activity that section 4o(1)(A)
covers. Moreover, the interpretation given section 4o(1)(B) by the Savage court makes a
section 4o(1)(B) violation easier to prove than a violation under section 4o(1)(A).
3,2 611 F.2d at 285.
313 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (1976).
31, 611 F.2d at 285.
315

See generally text accompanying notes 266-67 & 178-181 supra

:18 See notes 252 & 265 supra.

See generally text accompanying notes 266 & 267 supra.
See CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d at 285; In re Savage, CCH [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,139 at 29,923-24 (1976). See generally Mitchell,
The Regulation of Commodity Trading Advisers, 27 EMORY L.J. 957, 994 (1978).
31P See, e.g., Goodman v. Benson, 286 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1961). The purpose of the
'74 Act was to discourage fraudulent practices on futures contract market investors. See
31"
318
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Congress expects investment advisors to be knowledgeable in their areas.32 0 The Ninth Circuit reasonably interpreted section 4o to require a
standard of conduct which comports with traditional concepts of fiduciary obligations.21

D. Emergency Power of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 ('74

Act),3 22 Congress granted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(Commission)3 23 power to deal with emergencies in commodities trad-

ing.3 24 Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that an emergency
1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 24, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws
at 5874; see, e.g., CFTC v. U.S. Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1157-61 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
320 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 6m (West Supp. 1979) (registration); note 131 supra. See also
7 U.S.C. § 61 (1976) (congressional finding that commodity trading advisors and pool operators affect national public interest).
"" The Ninth Circuit narrowed its holding in Savage to Commission injunctive actions.
See text accompanying note 275 supra. Whether the Ninth Circuit would apply the same
rule in a private damage action is uncertain. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Hochfelder in
part because that decision applied to a private damage action. 611 F.2d at 284-85. The
Ninth Circuit applied Capital Gains in part because that decision involved a government
injunctive action. Id. at 285; see note 267 supra. The Second Circuit recently noted that the
policy considerations governing SEC enforcement hearings are different from those governing private damage actions. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 1979). Government
enforcement actions attempt to provide maximum protection for the investing public. Id.
Individual investors bring private actions to obtain monetary relief. Id. The effectiveness of
government enforcement actions based on negligence alone outweighs the potential harms to
those enjoined from violating securities laws. Id. See also SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544
F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100
(2d Cir. 1972).
The type of the complainant should not determine whether the defendant breached the
statute. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 217-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
court should consider, however, the relief that the complainant seeks. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., Inc., 275 U.S. 180, 192 (1963) (SEC did not seek to require the
fiduciary to disclose all his security holdings). Further, courts consider a number of factors
before determining whether to issue a permanent injunction. A court considers the defendant's likelihood of violating the statute in the future, the degree of scienter involved, the
defendant's sincerity, and the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct.
See SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied
sub nom. Homans v. SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); see, e.g., CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity
Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (injunction appropriate for "pervasive
wrongdoing" over extended period). See generally Markham, Injunctive Actions Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, 504 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) B-1, B-4 to B-15 (1979) (surveying CFTC injunctive cases). The Savage court, however, noted the need to temper the desire
to encourage Commission enforcement actions with an acknowledgement of the statute's
explicit provisions. 611 F.2d at 284 n.14.
"' Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 101-418, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-24
(West 1964 & Supp. 1979).
"S See note 107 supra.

311 See '74 Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 215, 88 Stat. 1404-05 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9)
(1976)). An emergency situation may arise whenever any major market disturbance prevents
commodity markets from accurately reflecting the forces of supply and demand for a com-
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exists, the Commission may direct commodity exchanges to take any action necessary to maintaan or restore orderly trading in commodity futures contracts.32 5 The term "emergency" encompasses threatened or actual market manipulations and corners,26 acts of the United States or a
foreign government affecting a commodity,3 27 and any other major market
disturbance which prevents the market from accurately reflecting the
forces of supply and demand for a commodity.32 8 The emergency power
conferred on the Commission is extraordinary.32 9 Yet, Congress has not
expressly provided for judicial review of the Commission's exercise of the
emergency power.3 30 The question therefore arises whether the Act immodity. Id.; see text accompanying notes 326-28 infra (emergency defined). Market disturbances which may create an emergency include government imposition of commodity price
controls or export trade embargoes, the intervention of a foreign government in the futures
market, national emergencies including natural disasters, and futures contract price manipulation through deceptive trading practice. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House Report]. See generally 1978 Senate Repdrt, supra
note 8 at 5-13, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2093-101 (brief history of commodities trading and regulation); 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 16-17, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5856-58 (mechanics of futures trading).
-11 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976). The Commission may limit trading in a futures contract to
liquidation, see note 333 infra, extend the expiration date of futures contracts, extend the
time for making deliveries in fulfillment of futures contracts, or suspend trading in futures
contracts. The Commission may also order exchanges to take any other action which, "in
the Commission's judgment, is necessary to maintain or restore orderly trading in, or liquidation of, any futures contract." 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976); 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2,
at 8, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5850.
=6 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976). The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibits all forms of
manipulative trading practice. Id. §§ 6c, 9, 13b. The Commission may suspend or revoke the
trading privileges of any person who has manipulated or attempted to manipulate the market price of a commodity. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). In addition, the Commission may direct
contract markets to take action necessary to maintain orderly trading in contracts subject to
manipulation. Id. § 12a(9); see text accompanying note 325 supra. "Cornering" is securing
such control over the supply of a commodity that its price can be manipulated. See 1978
Senate Report, supra note 8, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2161. See generally
Hudson, Customer Protectionin the Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U. L. REV. 1, 18-35
(1978) (discussion of manipulative commodities trading practices).
327 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976). Government activities which may cause a market emergency include foreign government intervention in commodity markets, war, and imposition
of trade embargoes or price controls. 1974 House Report, supra note 324, at 16 (1974).
318 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976). The phrase "major market disturbance" probably connotes
market disruption similar to that caused by market manipulation or government activity
affecting commodity trading. See 1974 House Report, supra note 324, at 15 (1974).
52' See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 25, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5865. Recognition of the extraordinary nature of the Commission's emergency power
prompted Congress to confine exercise of the power to three broadly defined categories of
emergencies. Id.; text accompanying notes 326-28 supra; note 360 infra.
"0 Compare 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976) (Commission emergency powers) with Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(k), 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976) (SEC power to suspend trading in
securities). Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) empowers the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to suspend trading in any security for a 10-day
period if the SEC determines that public interest and investor protection require such suspension. Id. Section 25(a)(1) of the '34 Act expressly provides for judicial review of SEC
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pliedly provides for judicial review.
Only two courts have considered the reviewability of Commission
emergency orders.331 The Seventh Circuit addressed the question in
Board of Trade of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission s 2 which involved a Commission emergency order to the Chicago
Board of Trade to suspend trading in the March 1979 Wheat Futures
Contract for the day of March 16, 1979. s s3 The Commission found that
transportation and warehouse facility shortages had caused a major market disturbance which prevented accurate market reflection of wheat supply and demand. The Commission also determined that the market diss
turbance created the threat of wheat market manipulation and corner. 3
Pursuant to the Commission's order, the Board of Trade suspended
trading in the wheat contract on March 16, 1979. Under exchange rules,
the Board of Trade also limited further trading in the wheat conract to
liquidation.33 5 The Commission apparently considered the Board of
orders. See 15 U.S.C. § 786(a)(1) (1976); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 107 (1978).
" See Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, 605 F.2d 1016, 1021-25 (7th Cir. 1979);
Equitable Trust Co. v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,902, at 23,663 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
332 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979).
33 Id. at 1018. On March 15, 1979, the Commission ordered the Board of Trade to
suspend all trading in the March 1979 Wheat Futures Contract for the following day. Id.
Under normal circumstances, trading in the contract would have stopped on March 21,
1979. The date set for delivery of wheat under the contract was March 30, 1979. Id. at 1019.
33 Id. at 1018. The Commission based its emergency order on information obtained
from market surveillance data, grain merchants, grain elevator operators, and futures commission merchants. Id. at 1018. The information gathered indicated that a small number of
speculative traders were maintaining large, potentially dominant, long positions in the
March wheat contract. Id. Traders holding long positions in a futures contract are obligated
to pay for and take delivery of a commodity at a fixed future date. As a practical matter, a
speculative trader will cover his obligation to pay by selling the contract and thereby avoid
taking delivery of the commodity. See 1 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 100, at 1011. On
March 15, 1979, the combined interest of a small number of speculative buyers in the March
wheat contract represented more than 80% of the total open interest in the contract. 605
F.2d at 1018. The combined interest in these traders substantially exceeded the total quantity of deliverable wheat. Id. Shortages of transportation and warehouse facilities precluded
movement of additional wheat into position for delivery. Id. at 1018-19. The Commission
concluded that these facility shortages produced an artificial imbalance between wheat supply and demand which would cause contract price distortions. Id. at 1019. The Commission
also was concerned that speculative interests were in a position to manipulate the wheat
contract price to their advantage. Id. at 1018; see note 326 supra.
35 See 605 F.2d at 1019. The Board of Trade's liquidation order limited trading in the
wheat contract to transactions that would offset or close out a futures contract position. See
1978 Senate Report, supra note 8, at 130, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2167
(liquidation defined). Contract markets, such as the Chicago Board of Trade, are authorized
to promulgate and are required to enforce their own rules and regulations. See 7 U.S.C. §
7a(1), (8) (1976). Such rules and regulations, however, are subject to alteration or supplementation by the Commission. Id. § 12a(7). Pursuant to such authority, the Commission has
promulgated regulations governing contract markets' actions in market emergencies. See 17
C.F.R. § 1.41 (1979). Subject to certain limitations, the regulations allow contract markets to
establish temporary emergency rules to deal with defined emergency situations. Id. Presum-
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Trade's additional limitation inadequate to deal with the continuing
emergency. On the afternoon of March 16, 1979, the Commission issued a
supplemental order requiring the Board of Trade to stop all trading in
the wheat contract. The Commission directed the Board of Trade to permit deliveries of wheat to fulfill contract requirements at the settlement
price in effect on March 15, 1979 and to settle any unfilled contract requirements on the contract's delivery date, March 30, 1979, at the March
15 settlement price."' 8
The Board of Trade instituted an action in federal district court seeking review of the Commission's emergency determination and a preliminary injunction of the Commission's supplemental order.337 The Board of
Trade asserted that the Commission's order was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, and in excess of the Commission's authority since no
emergency existed within the meaning of the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA or the Act).33 8 The Commission asserted that the emergency determination was not judicially reviewable.33 9 Based on the language of the
Act, the district court concluded that Commission emergency orders are
reviewable.340 The court found no evidence of an emergency within the
meaning of the CEA and granted the Board of Trade's motion for a preliminary injunction."'
The Commission filed notice of appeal and a motion for stay of the
district court's order pending appeal.34 2 At a hearing on the motion, a
ably, the Board of Trade acted pursuant to this rule-making authority in limiting further
trading in the wheat futures contract.
"I See 605 F.2d at 1019. The Commission may alter or supplement contract market
rules and regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7) (1976); see note 335 supra. The Commission issued
the supplemental order on the belief that an emergency situation continued to exist and
that the Board of Trade's provision for liquidation of open contract positions insufficiently
dealt with the emergency. See 605 F.2d at 1019.
33
See 605 F.2d at 1019; Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,780 (N.D. IMI.1979).
" 605 F.2d at 1019; see Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,780, at 23,185-6 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The Board of
Trade presented evidence tending to establish that no emergency existed. Id. The district
court's opinion does not describe the Board of Trade's evidence.
339 See 605 F.2d at 1019; Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, (1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fur. L. RE. (CCH) 1 20,780 at 23,185-5 (N.D. I. 1979). The Commission
argued that the emergency power was committed to Commission discretion and, therefore,
was nonreviewable. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976); text accompanying notes 350-53 infra.
340 See Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,780, at 23,185-5 (N.D. II1. 1979). Under the CEA, the Commission may
direct a contract market to take emergency action whenever the Commission "has reason to
believe that an emergency exists." See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976). The district court determined that the language of the CEA provides an objective, "reasonable belief" standard for
judicial review of Commission emergency action. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,780, at 23,185-5 (N.D. Mll.'1979).
3
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,780, 23,185-6; see 605
F.2d at 1019.
3" See 605 F.2d at 1020; Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,781, at 23,185-7 to 23,186 (7th Cir. 1979).
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Seventh Circuit panel determined that the Commission's order was judicially reviewable. 4 Since the Commission had failed to supply evidence
supporting the emergency determination, the Seventh Circuit considered
the Board of Trade's allegations undisputed and denied the Commission's
motion for stay."' The Seventh Circuit denied the Board of Trade's subsequent motion to dismiss the appeal, however, since the order denying
5
the motion for stay did not purport to rule on the merits of the case.3
On appeal, the Board of Trade argued that the Commission's claim
was moot.3 4 6 Since the district court's injunction order expired with the
expiration of the wheat futures contract on March 30, 1979, circumstances giving rise to the Commission's cause of action no longer existed
at the time of appeal.3 7 The Seventh Circuit reasoned, however, that any
emergency action taken by the Commission was likely to be of short duration and that similar controversies between the Board of Trade and the
Commission would likely arise in the future.3 4 8 A well-established exception to the mootness doctrine allows courts to hear cases capable of repetition, but evading judicial review. 34 9 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, denied the Board of Trade's motion to dismiss for mootness.
Considering the merits of the Commission's appeal, the Seventh Circuit determined that Commission emergency action is exempt from judicial review if precluded by the CEA or otherwise committed to the Commission's discretion by the Act.3 50 Since the CEA does not expressly
3 See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,781, at 23,186 (7th
Cir. 1979). The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the language
of the CEA and the nature of the Commission's emergency determination permit the courts
to review the alleged arbitrary nature of Commission emergency orders. Id.
3" See Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,781, at 23,186 (7th Cir. 1979).
" See 605 F.2d at 1020.
3" See 605 F.2d at 1020; Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88
HARv. L. REv. 373, 374-79 (1974).
"1 See 605 F.2d at 1020.
us Id. at 1020-21.
11 Id. at 1020. If a plaintiff bases a claim on conduct which ceases prior to litigation of
the claim and the plaintiff may reasonably expect to be subjected to the same conduct
again, a court may hear the plaintiff's claim even though the action is technically moot. SEC
v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1978); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975)
(per curiam); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-15 (1911). In Southern Pacific, appellants sought to enjoin an order of the ICC requiring appellants to cease
and desist for two years from preferring a certain shipper of cotton seed products. Id. at
499. Before hearing, the ICC order expired. Id. at 514. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the case was not subject to dismissal on the ground of mootness since the controversy was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 515.
350 605 F.2d at 1021; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976). Federal law provides for judicial
review of agency action unless a statute precludes judicial review or commits agency action
to agency discretion. Id. The Commission argued that the emergency determination is committed to Commission discretion under the CEA. 605 F.2d at 1021 n.6. The Commission
conceded, however, that emergency action, even if committed to agency discretion, is nevertheless judicially reviewable if challenged on constitutional grounds or on a claim of bad
faith or arbitrariness. Id.; see Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958) (action by agency,
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prohibit judicial review of Commission emergency action, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether Congress impliedly intended to preclude judicial review. 51 The court noted that only on a showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent should courts restrict access to judicial review.3 52 Such legislative intent must be determined from
the language and structure of the CEA, the Act's legislative history and
the nature of the Commission's emergency powers in the regulatory
scheme of the Act.358
The language of the CEA indicates that the Commission's emergency
determination is committed to Commission discretion.3 5 4 The Act provides that, whenever the Commission has reason to believe that an emergency exists, the Commission may direct exchanges to take action required to maintain orderly futures markets. 3 55 The Board of Trade
argued that the words "reason to believe" provide an objective standard
for review of Commission emergency action. 56 The Seventh Circuit, howunlawful because in excess of delegated power and contrary to specific prohibition, is judicially reviewable); Coppenbarger v. FAA, 558 F.2d 836, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1977) (challenge to
agency action based on violation of due process uniquely suited to judicial review); Ness
Investment Corp. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service, 512 F.2d 706, 715
(9th Cir. 1975) (judicial review available in action based on agency's abuse of discretion
where exercise of discretion exceeds constitutional, statutory or other legal mandates). See
generally Schwartz, Administrative Law in the Next Century, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 805 (1978).
351 605 F.2d at 1021-22. See Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 99 S. Ct.
2388, 2394 (1979); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1970). Southern Ry.questioned
whether the Interstate Commerce Commission's refusal to conduct an investigation provided for under the Interstate Commerce Act was impliedly subject to judicial review. See
99 S.Ct. at 2390-91. The Supreme Court found "persuasive reason" to believe that Congress
intended the ICC's investigation decision to be nonreviewable. Id. at 2394. The Court con,sidered the language of the statute in question permissive, not mandatory. Id. The language
also was silent as to factors which the ICC should consider in making investigation decisions. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress expressly provided for judicial review
of ICC action taken pursuant to other sections of the Interstate Commerce Act. Id. at 2395.
Congressional failure to provide for judicial review of the ICC investigation decision indicated congressional intent to preclude such review. Id. Finally, the legislative history of the
statute supported the Court's conclusion that the ICC investigation decision was nonreviewable. Id. at 2397.
352 605 F.2d at 1022; see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970) (administrative
action subject to judicial review unless nonreviewability demonstrated); Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (judicial review not precluded unless persuasive
reason to believe such was purpose of Congress).
353 605 F.2d at 1022; see Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 99 S.Ct.
2388,
2394-97 (1979); note 28 supra.
'" See text accompanying note 355 infra.
:55 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976); see note 325 supra.
" See 605 F.2d at 1022 n.7. Both the Seventh Circuit panel which denied the Commission's motion for stay and the district court which granted the preliminary injunction agreed
with the Board of Trade's assertion that the language of the Act provided a standard for
review of the Commission's emergency determination. See Board of Trade of Chicago v.
CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,781, at 23,186 (7th Cir.
1979); Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,780, at 23,185-5 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
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ever, interpreted the phrase "whenever [the Commission] has reason to
believe that an emergency exists" as establishing a subjective standard of
review.357 The Board of Trade also argued that since the Act limits the
s
situations in which the Commission may invoke its emergency powers 38
Congress had provided standards for review of the Commission's emergency determination.3 59 The court rejected the Board of Trade's argument and concluded that limiting the circumstances in which the Commission could use emergency powers did not indicate congressional intent
to remove the emergency determination from Commission discretion.3 0
The structure of the CEA also indicates congressional intent to commit emergency determinations to Commission discretion.36 1 The CEA
provides the Commission with traditional, discretionary methods of enforcing the Act's provisions.362 Since market emergencies are not necessarily the product of CEA violations, Congress sought to insure the Commission's regulatory effectiveness by providing the emergency power.363
Although the Board of Trade opinion is unclear, the Seventh Circuit apparently determined that since CEA enforcement was committed to Commission discretion, Congress intended that the emergency power also be
committed to Commission discretion.$6 Commission enforcement of the
CEA is expressly subject to judicial review.3 15 The Seventh Circuit con605 F.2d at 1022 n.7.
3" See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976); text accompanying notes 5-7 supra. The Act's definition of emergency confines Commission exercise of the emergency power to three broadly
35

defined situations. Id.; see note 360 infra.
"5 605 F.2d at 1022 & n.8.
60 Id. The legislative history of the '74 Act indicates that Congress recognized the extraordinary nature of the Commission's emergency power. See 1974 Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 25, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws at 5865. Consequently, Congress defined
emergency in such a way as to limit the exercise of the emergency power. Id.; see text accompanying notes 326-28 supra. Congress, however, did not define categories of emergencies
so narrowly-as to preclude the "effective use of the emergency powers" by the Commission
which "requires the careful exercise of expert and impartial judgment by the Commission."

See CoNF.REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprintedin [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5894, 5900 [hereinafter cited as 1974 Conference Report]. Thus, the Seventh Circuit

concluded that Congress utilized the CEA definition of emergency to designate the context
in which the Commission might exercise discretionary emergency powers. 605 F.2d at 1022-

23.
36

605 F.2d at 1023.

36

See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13a-1 (1976); see text accompanying notes 115-18 supra. The

Commission may bring administrative proceedings against any person suspected of violating
the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). The Act expressly provides for judicial review of such proceedings. Id. The Commission may also institute an action in district court to enjoin violations
of the CEA. Id. § 13a-1.
' See 605 F.2d at 1023 (quoting 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 25-26, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at 5860); 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976). The definition of

market emergency contemplates not only market manipulation and corners but also governmental actions affecting commodities and other major market disturbances which prevent
accurate commodity pricing. Id.; see text accompanying notes 327 & 328 supra.
3" See 605 F.2d at 1023.
365 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (administrative enforcement proceedings reviewable in
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action an indisidered the failure to provide judicial review of emergency
36
cation of congressional intent to preclude such review. 1
The Seventh Circuit observed that an emergency determination does
not lend itself to judicial review."' Market emergencies may be unforeseen, complex and rapidly changing. 68 The availability of judicial review
would neutralize the Commission's power to deal quickly with such emergencies.36 9 Thus; the court concluded that the congressional grant of
emergency power alone suggests an intent to commit emergency action to
37 0
Commission discretion.
Finally, the legislative history of the '74 Act indicates that the emergency determination is committed to Commission discretion.37 1 Congress
determined that commodity market volatility is detrimental to producers
and consumers of commodities.3 72 While considering enactment of the '74
federal courts); 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(g) (West Supp. 1979) (commission reparations order reviewable in federal court). While Commission enforcement of the Act is expressly reviewable in
the courts, the CEA does not provide expressly for judicial review of Commission emergency
action. See 605 F.2d at 1023.
"6 See 605 F.2d at 1023.
367

Id.

Id.; see notes 324 & 326-28 supra. Market disruptions, including government imposition of price controls or trade embargoes, intervention of foreign governments in domestic
futures markets, and national emergencies, may occur suddenly. Measures required to deal
effectively with such disruptions may be complex. See text accompanying notes 333-36
supra. Thus, Congress established the Commission which is composed of individuals with
commodity market expertise, and granted the Commission broad power to deal with market
emergencies. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 4a, 12a(9) (1976).
369 605 F.2d at 1023. Judicial review of Commission emergency action would hamper
the Commission's ability to move quickly to prevent or control commodity market emergencies. Id. During judicial review of Commission emergency orders, market disturbances might
proceed unchecked. Judicial review effectively would deprive commodity markets of Commission members' expertise in dealing with market emergencies. See id. at 1023, 1025.
370 605 F.2d at 1023. In Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977), the Supreme Court
considered the judicial reviewability of the United States Attorney General's action under §
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Section 5 establishes two
alternative methods by which states can obtain federal review of a change in their voting
laws. Id. Under one alternative a state may submit a change in voting laws to the Attorney
General and may enforce the change if the Attorney General has not objected within 60
days. Id. The Morris case involved a challenge to the Attorney General's failure to object to
a new South Carolina voting rights plan. 432 U.S. at 499. The Court reasoned that the
nature of the § 5 remedy, which the Court had previously characterized as an unusual and
severe procedure, strongly suggested that Congressdid not intend the Attorney General's §
5 determination to be subject to judicial review. Id. at 501.
311 605 F.2d at 1023; see 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 25-26, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5865-66, 5879; 1974 House Report, supra note 324, at 30 (1974); 1974
Conference Report, supra note 360, at 37-38, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nsws at 58993'

900.

92 See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976). Commodity prices are susceptible to speculation. Id. Sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of commodities frequently occur as a result
of such speculation. Id. Unreasonable market fluctuations are the product of inefficient commodity pricing which is detrimental to producers and consumers of commodities. Id. Congress decided to regulate commodity futures trading to protect the national public interest
in stable, efficient commodity markets. Id.; see 605 F.2d at 1023-24.
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Act, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry concluded that
the Commission could not be expected to control rapidly expanding and
complex futures markets without broad authority over commodity ex3 Based on a similar assessment of the Commission's regulatory
changes3 M
role, the House Committee on Agriculture favorably reported a bill which
granted the Commission emergency authority over exchanges whenever
the Commission had reason to believe that market conditions threatened
orderly trading in futures contracts. 37 The Senate Committee considered
the House emergency authorization too broad, noting that the House bill
would allow the Commission to use the emergency power in situations
other than major market disturbances. 375 As a compromise, Congress
adopted the current emergency provisions of the CEA which restrict
Commission emergency authority over exchanges to specified circumstances.37 6 Within the CEA definition of emergency, however, Congress
committed effective use of the emergency power to careful exercise of expert and impartail judgment by the Commission.37 7 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the legislative history of the '74 Act evidenced congressional intent to commit the emergency determination,3 7within definitional
boundaries, to the sole discretion of the Commission.

1

Following the Seventh Circuit's lead, the court in Equitable Trust Co.
See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 19, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5859. The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry felt that the Commission must
have authority over exchanges in order to insure that contract markets perform their regulatory functions. Id. Only with such authority could the Commission effectively oversee commodity markets. Id.
See H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 215, 120 CONG. REc. 33038 (1974).
75 See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 25, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5865-66. Since the House version of the emergency powers section granted the Commission
emergency authority over exchanges whenever the Commission had reason to believe that
market conditions threatened orderly trading in futures contracts, the Senate Committee
felt that the House bill granted the Commission too much freedom in exercising the emergency power. Id. at 5865. The Senate Committee therefore proposed an amendment to the
House definition of "emergency" to restrict the circumstances in which the Commission
might exercise its emergency powers. The Senate Committee amendment also provided that,
in order to qualify as an emergency, a market disruption must have a greater adverse impact
on commodity markets than proposed Commission emergency action. Id.
376 See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1976); 1974 Conference Report, supra note 360, at 37-38,
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5899-900. House and Senate conferees adopted the
Senate definition of "emergency" which limited exercise of Commission emergency power to
three broad emergency categories. Id.; see text accompanying notes 326-28 supra.The Conference Committee deleted a portion of the Senate definition which required an emergency
to have a greater adverse impact on commodity markets than action proposed by the Commission to control the emergency. 1974 Conference Report, supra note 360, at 38, [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5899-900.
377 1974 Conference Report, supra note 360, at 38, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 5900.
378 605 F.2d at 1025. The court stated that "judicial review of the Commission's emergency determination would thwart the very purpose for which Congress authorized the
emergency powers." Id. The availability of judicial review would preclude the Commission's
ability to take swift and effective action when a market emergency arises. Id.
373

:74
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v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission3 79 concluded that Commission emergency orders are nonreviewable 8 ° The plaintiff, Equitable
Trust Company (Equitable), sought declaratory relief from a Commission
emergency order.3 81 The order recited the Commission's belief that foreign government activity in the coffee futures market was preventing accurate market reflection of coffee supply and demand. According to the
Commission, the disruptive activity of foreign governments created a
threat of coffee market manipulation and corner.382 Consequently, the
Commission ordered coffee traders to reduce their holdings of coffee futures contracts.3 83 Equitable considered itself aggrieved by the Commission's order since parties to litigation then pending against Equitable
might assert the emergency order as an excuse for breaching certain contracts with the company. 3 " The district court dismissed Equitable's complaint, however, reasoning that the courts have no jurisdiction to review
3 85
Commission emergency orders.
The Equitable Trust court considered the language of the Act indicative of congressional intent to commit the emergency determination to
Commission discretion.38 6 The court observed that the Commission may
direct exchanges to take such action as "in the Commission's judgment"
is necessary whenever the Commission "has reason to believe that an
emergency exists. 3 8 7 The court rejected the argument that the CEA
emergency definition provides an objective standard by which to measure
Commission action. The emergency definition provides only boundaries
within which the Commission may exercise discretionary emergency authority.38 8 The court also considered judicial review of the emergency de[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,902 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
180 Id. at 23,664. The district court stated that neither the emergency determination nor
the remedial measures taken by the Commission are reviewable in the courts. Id. The district court based its conclusion of nonreviewability on the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit
in Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, 605 F.2d 1018 (7th Cir. 1979). See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,664.
33 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,663.
38' See id. The Commission perceived the threat of manipulation and corner in the
171

December 1977 Coffee "C" Futures Contract traded on the New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange. Id. Anticipated supplies of coffee were ins.ufficient to fulfill the coffee futures contract requirements. Id. at 23,663 n.1. In addition, a small group of coffee traders controlled
both large positions in the coffee futures contract and a significant percentage of the known
coffee supply. Id. By manipulating the supply of coffee, these traders could manipulate the
price of the coffee futures contract. See note 334 supra.
M [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,663.
Id. Equitable asserted that the Commission had no reason to believe that an emergency existed and that issuance of the emergency order was an abuse of discretion in excess
of the Commission's statutory authority. Id.
U5 Id.; see text accompanying notes 386-90 infra.
See Equitable Trust Co. v. CFTC, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 20,902, at 23,664 (W.D. Tex. 1979); text accompanying notes 355-60 supra.
"1
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,664; see 7 U.S.C. §
12a(9) (1976); text accompanying notes 355-57 supra.
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,664; see text accompa-
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termination inappropriate since such review might prevent the Commission from taking appropriate steps to remedy market disruptions.3 89
Finally, the court reasoned that mere congressional provision for Commission emergency power suggests that Congress intended to commit
emergency action to Commission discretion.3 90
Based on the language and structure of the CEA, the nature of the
Commission's emergency determination, and the legislative history of the
'74 Act, the Board of Trade and Equitable Trust courts concluded that
Congress intended to commit the emergency determination to Commission discretion.39 1 Although evidence of such legislative intent is less than
clear and convincing, 92 the courts' conclusion is sound. Allowing those
affected by Commission emergency orders, including contract markets, to
seek judicial review of such orders would prevent the exercise of emergency power expressly conferred on the Commission.393 Where an inference of judicial review would preclude proper operation of a federal statute, the inference should be avoided. Whether Congress should confer
emergency power on the Commission, leave market regulation to the exchanges or allow market forces to correct market disruption is not in
question. Given the existence of Commission emergency power, the question is simply whether the exercise of such power is judicially reviewable.
The courts in Board of Trade and Equitable Trust have concluded that
Commission exercise of emergency power is not reviewable.
STEVEN M. JOHNSON
TYLER M. MOORE

Dying notes 358-60 supra. Since the effective use of the emergency powers requires the careful exercise of expert judgment by the Commission, the emergency determination must be
left to Commission discretion. See [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FaT. L. REP. (CCH)
at 23,664; 1974 Conference Report, supra note 360, at 38, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5900; note 360 supra.
38,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,664; see text accompanying notes 367-69 supra.
39 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,664; see text accompanying note 370 supra.
391Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, 605 F.2d at 1025; Equitable Trust Co. v. CFTC,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,664.
...See The National Law Journal, Oct. 8, 1979, at 37; text accompanying note 352
supra.
"' See 605 F.2d at 1025; [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at
23,664.

